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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM

~ 5~.

September 29, 1986 Conference
Summer List 21, Sheet 1
No. 86-87-CFY
United States

Cert to: CA2 (Kearse, Newman,
Feinberg [dis.])

v.
Salerno and Cafaro
(kept in pretrial
detention)

1.

SUMMARY:

Federal/Criminal

Un~

d

States challenges CA2 decision

Timel y

that

Section 3142(e) of the Bail Reform Act of 1984 is facially unconstitutional.

2.

FACTS

AND

~ 18 u.s.c.
law

governing

~

PROCEEDINGS

(Supp.

BELOW:

The Bail Reform Act of

§3141 _e_t_._s_e_q~.,

II)

pretrial

-

release

of

revised the federal

criminal

suspects.

Under

§3142(e) of the Act,

if a judicial officer "finds that no condi-

tion

of

or

combination

conditions

will

reasonably assure

the

appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other
person and the community," the officer "shall order the detention
of

the person prior to trial."

the

Upon the government's request,

j ud ic ial officer must hold a pretrial de tent ion hearing

in

cases involving crimes of violence, offenses that may result in a
sentence

of

life

imprisonment

or

death,

serious

drug-related

crimes, and felonies committed by persons previously convicted of
serious crimes.
fies

a

vseries

§3142(f) (1).

Section 3142(f) of the Act speci-

of procedural safeguards.

'rhe per son resisting

detention may request the presence of legal counsel at the hearing, may testify and present witnesses, may cross-examine other
witnesses,

and may present

officer must take

evidence by proffer.

into account specific factors,

The

j ud ic ial

including the

nature and seriousness of the charges against the suspect, the
weight of the evidence,

the history and character is tics of the

person, and the nature and seriousness of the danger to any other
person or

the community

release.

§3142 (g).

The

that would
judicial

be posed
officer's

by the suspect' s
findings

that

no

conditions will reasonably assure the safety of other persons and
the community must be

"supported by clear and convincing evi-

dence,"

the detention order must include written

§3142(f),

and

-

.:S -

findings of fact and a statement of reasons for

the detention,

§3142(i).
Salerno, t~e reputed leader of the Genovese organized crime

..---

fa~

, and Cafaro, a reputed "captain" in the organization, were
--,

charged with various

racketeering offenses and violent er imes,

including two murder conspiracies.

The government sought pretri-

al detention of resps pursuant to §3142(e)

and the < c (s.D.N.Y.,

Walker, J.) \....--h eld an evidentiary hearing.
ted evidence that resps were engaged

The government submit-

in a continuing course of

illegal and violent activity and that no conditions of release
would

prevent

resps

pend ency of their

from

trial.

resuming
The ~

those

activities during

agreed.

the

It characterized the

government's evidence against resps as "overwhelming," and stated
that the activities of a criminal organization such as the Genovese family would not cease with the release of its principals
"on even the most stringent of bail conditions."
businesses,
and

in place for many years,

protection,

this

court

or

they will fail.

recognizes

criminal enterprise's]
When business as usual
the present danger
evident."

a

strong

"The illegal

require constant at tent i.on
Under

these circumstances,

incentive on

the part of

[the

leadership to continue business as usual.
involves threats,

such people pose

Pet. App. 56a-57a.

beatings,

and murder,

to the community is self-

Resp's trial was assigned to Judge

Lowe (S.D.N.Y.), who reviewed and upheld Judge Walker's detention
order./

✓ cA2

rever sed.

The court agreed that the evidence preferred

by the government amply supported the DC's finding that the re-

•

-

q

-

lease of resps posed a danger to the community.

Nevertheless, a

majority

Process

of

the

court

concluded

that

-------..

"the Due

Clause

prohibits pretrial detention on the ground of danger to the community."

Pet. App. 14a.

----__/

Pretrial detention may be validly imposed when substantial
evidence indicates that a defendant might flee or might threaten
potential witnesses,
process.

jurors, or others involved in the judicial

"Pretrial detention to avoid undue risks of flight or

jeopardy to the trial process (is] not prohibited by a constitutional scheme that relies on a trial process to determine guilt
and enforce

the er iminal

law."

Pet.

App.

19a

(Newman, J. concur-

States v. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d at 1002
ring)).

Pretrial detention on

would carry out violent
pletely different.
est

(quoting United

the sole basis

"business as usual"

that defendants

is,

however,

com-

There is certainly a compelling state inter-

in maintaining public safety.

justice contemplated

by

But the

system of criminal

the Due Process Clause

is

that people

will be accountable "for what they have done, not for what they
may do.

The Due Process Clause reflects the constitutional im-

perative that incarceration to protect society from criminals may
be accomplished only as punishment of those convicted for past
crimes and not as
future crimes."

regulation of

those feared

likely to commit

Pet. App. 17a (quoting Melendez-Carrion)

(empha-

sis in original omitted).
The Due Process Clause would clearly prohibit incarcerating
a

person not even accused of a er ime

in order

to prevent his

future
crimes, and would bar preventive detention of a person who
,

/

-

::> -

has been convicted of past er imes and has served his sentence.
It must equally bar detention of a person not convicted but only
accused of a crime.

Detention of persons arrested for criminal

conduct is unconstitutional "not because preventing crime is less
important than preventing a defendant's flight,"
but because

Pet. App.

20a,

that particular means of preventing crime violates

substantive due process, regardless of any particular procedural
due

process

protections

in

the

Act.

The proper

governmental

response in a case of suspected dangerousness is surveillance of
the suspect and a prompt trial.
The

decision

in Schall v.

Martin,

467

U.S.

253

(1984),

upholding brief preventive detention of juveniles, does not dispose of this case.

Though the governmental interest in protect-

ing the public is of high order whether the danger is posed by
juveniles or adults, the Court in Schall pointed out "that juveniles,

'who unlike adults, are always in some form of custody,'

id.

265,

at

have an

that of adults."

interest

in liberty less substantial than

Pet. App. 22a.

In addition, CA2 stated that it

disagreed with the decisions of others CAs that have upheld the
constitutionality of pretrial detention on the ground of dangerousness (referring, without elaboration, to the reasons stated by
Judge Newman in Melendez-Carrion).
V.chief

Judge Feinberg

dissented.

He

noted

that Congress

enacted the preventive detention provision of the Bail Reform Act
out of a deep concern with "'the growing problem of crimes committed by persons on release."'
Report).

•

Pet. App.

24a

(quoting Senate

In Schall, the Court concluded that the need to protect

-

b -

the community was a "legitimate and compelling" government interest that could constitutionally justify the pretrial detenti o n of
juveniles.

Although the liberty interest of juveniles is conced-

edly inferior to that of adults, the compelling societal interest
in protecting
person

the community does not vary with the age of the

detained,

and

if

anything,

adults who may have superior
fenses.

"Accordingly,

is

access

stronger

with

to committing

regard

to

serious of-

the government has advanced a legitimate

and compelling reason for pretrial confinement of adults accused
of crimes."

Pet. App.

25a.

Further, although due process dic-

tates that the government not pursue its goals through "conduct
that shocks the conscience," Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165,
172

(1952),

science

there

is

"nothing

inherently shocking

to the con-

in using a predict ion of future er imi nal i ty to justify

confinement."

Pet. App. 26a.

Although the statute may be uncon-

stitutional as applied if pretrial detention is so lengthy as to
constitute punishment, the statute is constitutional on its face.
CONTENTIONS:

3.

CA2' s

holding

directly

gress' purpose in passing the Bail Reform Act.
the pretrial detention provision
over

the

release."
Senate

"alarming problem of

frustrates

Congress enacted

in response to public concern

er imes

committed

by per sons on

S. Rep. 98-225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1983).

Judiciary Committee

Con-

recognized

that

pretrial

The

detention

could raise constitutional questions, but concluded after serious
analysis

that

"pretrial detention

tional mechanism for

is a necessary and cons ti tu-

incapacitating, pending trial, a reasonably

identifiable
group of defendants who would pose a serious risk to
,

-

7 -

the safety of others if released."

Id. at 10.

Congress included

elaborate procedural safeguards for potential detainees, thereby
attempting to strike a balance between the government's interest
in protecting the public and the defendant's interest in retaining freedom.

CA2's blanket holding completely sweeps aside this

effort by Congress to accommodate competing interests.
CA2's holding is also in conflict with decisions by CA3 and
CA7, that have rejected due process challenges to the Bail Reform
Act's

preventive

detention

provisions.

See

United

States

v.

Perry, 788 F.2d 100 (CA3 1986); United States v. Portes, 786 F.2d
758

(CA7 1985);

1986).

United States v.

Accetturo,

See also United States v. Edwards,

1981)

(upholding

denied,

D.C. 's

455 U.S. 1022

preventive

(1982).

783 F.2d 382
430 A.2d 1321

detention

statute),

(CA3
(D.C.
cert.

This Court's review is necessary

to resolve the conflict.
On the merits, CA2 is wrong.

First, federal statutes enjoy

a presumption of validity, particularly where Congress has specifically considered potential due process objections.

Second,

due process essentially commands that a balance must be struck
between

an

society.

individual's
In

the

liberty

er iminal

and

context,

the
th is

demands of
balance

organized

"represents a

necessary accommodation between the individual's right to liberty
and the State's duty to control crime."
U.S. 103, 112

(1975).

There

"legitimate and compelling"
from er ime,
Scpall

v.

and

Gerstein v. Pugh,

420

is no doubt that the state has a

interest in protecting the community

that future er iminal conauct can be predicted.

Martin,

467 U.S.

at

264,

278-79.

Thus,

the use of

-

0

-

pretrial detention in cases where no conditions will reasonably
assure the safety of the community is neither an "arbitrary imposition" nor a "purposeless restraint" on an individual's liberty.
Pet.

15

(citations omitted).

CA2,

by concluding that pretrial

detention on the basis of dangerousness is a ~ se violation of
substantive due process, has rejected any balancing of governmental

and personal

interests

and its analysis thereby "conflicts

with the approach consistently used by this Court in analyzing
statutory restraints on liberty

• " Pet. 16.

This Court has upheld various types of pretrial detention.
See Schall (Pretrial detention of juveniles); Greenwood v. United
States,

350 U.S.

366

(1956)

(pretrial detention of potentially

dangerous mentally incompetent defendant);
345 U.S.

206

(1953)

Shaughnessy v. Mezei,

(indefinite detention of potentially danger-

ous returning resident alien).

Thus, the use of pretrial deten-

tion to protect the public from particularly dangerous persons
does not offend the "conce?t of ordered liberty"
at 325).

(Palko, 302 U.S.

Indeed, CA2's contrary conclusion would lea1 to strik-

ingly anomalous results.

A court could detain a mentally incom-

petent person or a street criminal who threatened a witness, but
would

have

to

release

an

intentionally

threatened the public at large.

vicious

defendant who

Substantive due process does not

compel these incongruous results.
4.

ments

for

DISCUSSION:

granting

The government presents
review

in this case.

two strong argu-

'First, whether CA2's

constitutional analysis is correct or not, its aecision strikes
down a critical section of an act that is important in the admin-

•

-

istration of criminal justice.

y -

Tn addition, CA2's holding clear-

ly frustrates the express goal of ~ongress in passing §3142(e) of
the Bail Reform Act.
tee,
ized

s.

The report of the Senate ~udiciary Commit-

Rep. 98-225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7

the

pretrial

detention

provisions

as

(1983), character-

responding

to

the

"broad base of support for giving judges the authority to weigh
risks to community safety in pretrial rel ease decisions" and the
report stressed that "the Committee has given thorough consideration to the issues which have arisen during the lengthy debate
over pretrial detention."

"I'he Committee concluded that the "im-

portant societal interest" in protecting the public from a "limited

group of

offenders"

who

are

likely

to commit

additional

crimes was sufficiently compelling to overcome the liberty interests of those individuals and to make those pretrial detentions
appropriate and constitutionally valid.

Id. at 7.

CA2's deci-

sion directly rejects Congress' reasoning.
Second,

the SG argues

that CA2's decision is in conflict

with decisions by CA3 and CA7.

CA2's ultimate result

(striking

down §3142(e)) is certainly in conflict with decisions from those
two circuits, although neither of those courts has engaged in as
complete a constitutional analysis on the substantive due process
question as

has CA2.

In United Stat es v. Accetturo,

78 2 F. 2d

382, 387-88 (CA3 1986), the substantive due process issue was not
even raised.

The defendants there challenged §3142(e) solely on

the grounds that it failed to direct judges to consider the probable length of pretrial detention that would be faced by defendants.

CA3 rejected that challenge on the ground that Congress

-

J.U

-

legitimately chose to rely on the Speedy Trial Act to regulate
the

length of pretrial dela ys for

defendants.

In United States v.

both detained and undetained
l?errv,

788 F.2d 100,

112-113

(CA3 1986), the defendants did present a facial challenge to the
Act on, inter alia, substantive due process grounds.
analysis, CA3 stated

that

in Jackson v.

Indiana,

In a brief

406 U.S.

715

(1972), the Supreme Court explained that its holding in Greenwood
(1956) (allowing civil detention of individuals mentally incompetent

to stand

trial)

was based on the fact

persons had been found to be dangerous :
cause

that such detained

CA3 concluded that be-

the Bail Reform Act only permitted detention of "persons

found to be dangerous in a very real sense (--] distributors of
dangerous drugs and users of firearms in the commission of crimes
of violence," there was no substantive due process violation.
United States v.

Portes,

786 F.2d 758,

767-78

In

(1985), CA7 also

engaged in a rather brief analysis of a due process challenge.
The court did

not use

the

term "substantive due process," but

simply stated

that pretrial detention to protect the community

was not "punishment" in violation of the fifth amendment's prohibition of punishment "'prior to an adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of
Bell v. Wolfish,

law."'

441 U.S. at 535).

as facially constitutional.

786 F.2d at 767

(quoting

It therefore upheld the Act

Thus, CA2's holding is in conflict

with the results reache~ by CA3 and CA7, although the debate on
substantive due process is certainly not as well formulated as it
could be for purposes of this Court's review.

-

On the merits,
Bell v. Wolfish,

I

.L.L

-

think this

441 U.S.

is a difficult question.

520, 534 n. 15

pressly left open the question whether,
ment's substantial

interest

er imes are available

for

---..,

(1979), the Court exapart from the govern-

in ensuring that people accused of

trial,

"other governmental objectives

may constitutionally justify pretrial detention."
Martin,

467 U.S.

253

In

(1984),

In Schall v.

the Court had the opportunity to

consider this question in the context of a New York statute that
allowed for the pretrial detention of juveniles who posed a "serious risk" of committing a crime before trial.
that

~he Court stated

there is a "'legitimate and compelling state interest'

in

protecting the community from crime," 467 U.S. at 264 (quoting De
Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 155 (1960)).
state, however,
freedom

•

It then went on to

that the "juvenile's countervailing interest in

. must be qualified by the recognition that juve-

niles, unlike adults, are always in some form of custody • • • In
this respect, the juvenile's liberty interest may, in appropriate
circumstances,

be

subordinated

to

the State's

'parens patriae

interest in preserving and promoting the welfare of the child.'"
4 6 7 u • s • at

26 5

( c i tat ion om i t t e d ) •

Thus,

the Court did not

choose to hold that the compelling governmental interest in preventing

future er ime was,

by itself, sufficient to overcome an

individual's liberty interest.
Given this case law,
It

agreed

that

providing

CA2's analysis

is not unreasonable.

protection against

the occurrence of

future crimes is an interest of high social value.

Nevertheless,

even
according that objective the "highest value," CA2 could not
,

-

agree

that

..LL.

-

the objective could constitutionally be achieved by

incarcerating a person likely to commit crimes
CA2

is

prohibit

correct

that

due

CA2' s

that

the person

conclusion

that

the

process would

incarcerating a person without a

government's proof
er imes.

substantive

in

is

" [ t] he

trial

ordinarily

simply on the

likely to commit
lodging

future.

of

future

charges

for

alleged past crimes does not alter this concept of due process,"
Pet. App. 18a, is certainly not unreasonable.
Regardless

of

the

merits

of

CA2 's

analysis,

still think the granting of cert is appropriate.

however,

I

CA2's decision,

as noted above, does overturn a critical section of an important
criminal law and directly undermines a express objective of Congress.

Moreover,

al though one may ordinarily wish to wait for

more circuits to address directly

(and more thoroughly)

the same

substantive due process concern raised by CA2, that does not seem
particularly appropriate

here.

In

this case,

it

is

important

that the Bail Reform Act be applied uniformly, and CA2's decision
itself will probably affect a number of important criminal detention cases.

In addition, although CA2's analysis may be reason-

able, even in light of Schall,

some of Schall's analysis could

certainly support a reversal of the CA2 decision.
There is no response, and therefore I recommend calling for
one.

5.

RECOMMENDATION:

September 2, 1986

I recommend CFR with an eye to grant.
Feldblum

Opn in petn

'3eAor )\\().\i~ to .up.JJ~,
(,f pePJ ~ cue\- ~~)
~cJ11c.k~e..

October 31, 1986 Conference
List 3, Sheet 1
No. 86-87
Motion of petitioner to
expedite consideration 1

UNITED STATES

v.
ANTHONY SALERNO

SUMMARY:

Th ~

equests that the Court give expedited

consideration to U

vernment's challenge t o t~

'j

ruling

that a provision of the Bail Reform Act of 1984 concerning

-----------

pretrial detention
is unconstitutional.
BACKGROUND:

Resps are reputed leaders of organized crime.

Resps were charged with various racketeering offenses and violent
crimes.

The Government sought pretrial detention of resps

pursuant to Section 3142(e) of the Bail Reform Act of 1984,

1 This motion was added to the previously listed petn for cert
after the Conference List was circulated. This memorandum

G~nlch~::o~;~~~~~

14 Foo(~

~i

-

18 U.S.C.

{Supp. II)

2 -

3141 e t ~ - , which authorizes detention of

a criminal defendant if no release conditions "will reasonably
assure

• the safety of any other person and the community."

The DC ordered resps detained on the ground that there was
"overwhelming" evidence that, if released, resps would continue
to engage in violent criminal behavior.
Resps appealed to the CA 2.

The CA 2 {Kearse and Newman,

with Finberg dissenting) held that section 3142{e)'s
authorization of pretrial detention based on a determination of
future dangerousness was facially unconstitutional as a violation
of substantive due process.

The CA 2 stayed the issuance of its

mandate to allow the Government to seek this Court's review.
The Government promptly filed a petn for cert.
court requested a response, resp filed an answer.

After the
The petn is

scheduled for consideration at the October 31, 1986, Conference.
Resps are still incarcerated subject to the DC's order of
pretrial detention.

Trial is scheduled to begin on January 19,

1987, and is expected to last approximately four months.
CONTENTIONS:
alleges that:

In support of the motion to expedite the SG

{l) the CA 2's declaration that the pretrial

detention provisions of the Bail Reform Ace are unconstitutional
"presents a question of great importance to the administration of
the criminal law;"

(2) the CA 2's decision "has largely paralyzed

the application of the Bail Reform Act's pretrial detention
provisions within the Second Circuit;" {3) expedited
consideration may be necessary to protect the Court's

•

jurisdiction because trial will commence in January and the case

-

~

-

may become moot with the completion of the trial; and (4) resps
do not oppose expedition.
To facilitate the Court hearing the case in January 1987,
the SG offers to file his brief within fifteen days of the
Court's grant of cert.

The SG suggests that resps brief be due

30 days after receipt of its brief and that the Government file
its reply brief one week before oral argument.

The SG also

suggests that all briefs be served "through the use of an
overnight delivery service."

This means that if the Court grants

cert on Monday, November 3, 1986, the SG's brief will be filed on
or about Tuesday, November 18, 1986, and resps brief would be
filed by Friday December 19, 1986.

Under this schedule the case

could be scheduled for argument in January 1987.
Resps have filed a response to the motion urging that the
Court grant the SG's motion and expedite its consideration of
this case.
DISCUSSION:

If the Court grants the petn for cert, it

should also grant the motion to expedite.

Resps' pretrial

detention may become a moot issue with the conclusion of resps'
trial.

Therefore, the Court should adjust its schedule to allow

it to complete consideration of the case before the conclusion of
the trial.

Expediting the case will (1) make it less likely that

the case will become moot before oral argument, and (2) reduce
the stress on counsel of simultaneously defending resps at trial
in the DC and briefing and arguing the case before this Court.
In addition, the reasons for granting cert (i.e., the importance
of 'the issue, the existence of conflicts between the circuits and

-

4

-

the possibility of further conflicts) also support expedition.
Finally, expedition does not impose any hardship on the parties 2
or the Court.

Resps support petr's motion to expedite and the

schedule recommended by the parties will not inconvenience the
Court.
CONCLUSIONS:

If the Court grants cert, the Court should

expedite the case in order to lessen the possibility that the
issue of pretrial detention might escape review because resps'
trial began and concluded before the Court heard oral argument.
Even if expediti o n is not strictly necessary to avoid a question
of the case becoming moot,

(1) the importance of the issue,

the apparent confusion on the issue in the various circuits,

(2)
(3)

the parties willingness to expedite the case, and (4) the fact
that expedition will not inconvenience the Court, all recommend
that the motion to expedite be granted.
There is a response urging that the motion be granted.
October 27, 1986

Schickele

2 Since the CA 2 stayed its mandate, resps will continue to be
detained pending trial until, and unless, this Court denies cert
or affirms the CA 2. Thus, expedition will not harm, and may
benefit, resps.

October 31, 1986
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United States v. Salerno and Cafaro (CA2)

MEMO TO FILE:
Section

3142(e)

of

the

Bail

Reform

Act

of

1984

authorizes the pretrial detention of an indicted defendant
if,

after

a

convincing

hearing,

evidence

reasonably assure

a

court

finds

"no

release

that

upon

clear

conditions

and
will

the safety of any other person and

the community".
In

this

case,

CA2,

in

an

opinion

by Judge

Kearse

joined by Judge Newman, held that this section of the Act
is facially unconstitutional as a violation of substantive
due process.
Some

Judge Fineberg dissented persuasively.

half

a

dozen

other

addressed the same question,
Reform Act

courts

of

appeals

have

and concluded that the Bail

is not facially invalid.

See P.

11, n.

8 of

the brief for the United States.
CA2 agreed that pretrial detention of a defendant is
lawful where evidence indicated a likelihood that he would
flee,

and

however,

not

that

be
it

available
would

be

for

trial.

CA2

unconstitutional

reasoned,
to

hold

a

.
I

'

citizen in jail simply because there was evidence that he
probably would endanger the safety of others.
the

case

before

members of

us

is

the Mafia,

different.

have been

Here

indicted,

Of course
respondents,

and

the TC -

relying primarily on taped conversations - found clear and
convincing

evidence

that

the

public

Fineberg

persuasively

safety

would

be

endangered.
Judge

dissented,

and

I

am

inclined to agree with him and with the SG's brief.
I should add,

however,

that the briefs on behalf of

respondent are well written, and present strong arguments
at least on their face.

In essence, they emphasize that

the effect of pretrial detention is to "inflict punishment
prior

to

a

determinaition of

guilt".

normally is a denial of due process.

This,

of

course,

Respondents cite a

good many of our cases that support this general truth:
Bell v. Wolfish; Palko v. Connecticut, Kennedy v. MendozaMartinez,
directly

and others.
in

arguments,

point.

I

do not believe there is a case

Despite

the

force

of

respondents'

I think the carefully designed Bail Reform Act

is constitutional.

It strikes a proper balance, at least

this is my present tenative view, between the right of a
person not to be incarcerated prior to a determination of

gui 1 t
from

and the need to protect persons and the community
the

type

of

criminal

conduct

that

has

case

is

been

so

pervasive in organized crime.

*
Although
constitutional

I

do

not

*

*
think

difficulty,

I

invalidate the Bail Reform Act.

this
would

be

free

hesitant

from
to

The courts can adequately

protect the rights of defendants by requiring clear and
convincing evidence of danger to other persons.
Unless my clerk has a different view,
memo will suffice.
LFP, JR.

a very brief

ral 01/13/87

January 13, 1987
To:
From:

Justice Powell
Bob
No. 86-87, United States v. Salerno and Cafaro

Apparently this case is not moot. The SG's reply brf. states
that Cafaro has not been convicted of anything, although he has
been "temporarily released" for medical reasons.
The SG also
states that Salerno has not been sentenced yet for his unrelated
conviction, and is still--S-eing held under the precentive detention order at issue here. Reply brf. , at 1 n. 1.
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No. 86-87, United States v. Salerno and Cafaro

r

2'

Cert. to CA2 (Newman, Kearse, Feinberg [dissenting])
Wednesday, January 21, 1987 (4th case)

Question Presented
1.

Is

@a

~I- ~

BENCH MEMORANDUM

J~

't

~A--~~~--~

~ ~~ ,, ~ ~ .

::r~

-.....L-£<

§3142(e)

of

the

Bail

Reform Act

of

1984,

which

authorizes the pretrial detention of an indicted defendant if no
release conditions "will reasonably assure •.• the safety of any
ot.her person and the community," unconstitutional on its face?

2.

I.

BACKGROUND

If a person is charged with a ~ime of violence, an offense
that may result in a life sentence or death,
related

crime,

or

if

the

serious drug-

person has been convicted of such a

crime and is charged with a felony,

the prosecutor may move for

preventive detention under 18 U .s.c.

§3142(f) (1).

provides for an immediate evidentiary hearing.
seek a continuance of up to 5 days;
continuance of up to 3 days;
for good cause shown.

...........

a

The defendant may

the prosecutor may seek a

longer continuances are permitted

u.s.c.

18

The statute

§3142(f).

At the hearing, the

suspect may be represented by counsel; may present evidence on
his own behalf; may cross-examine government witnesses; and may
present

evidence

by

factors

that

judicial

deciding

the

whether

proffer.

to

officer

allow

The

Ibid.
must

pretrial

statute

take

into

specifies
account

§3142(g).

release.

in
The

judicial officer may order preventive detention only if he finds
that no condition or combination of conditions of release will
~

i,r

' 1/

asonably assure the safety of the community.
supported

by

accompanied
reasons.

"clear
by

and

written

§3142(i).

convincing"

findings

of

The order must be

evidence,
fact

and

The statute provides for

§3142 (f),
a

statement

and
of

expedited review.

§3145(b)-(c).
Resps were arrested on March 21, 1986, and charged in a 29count

indictment with

extortion,
operations.
activity,

and
The

RICO

operation
RICO

including

violations,

mail

and

of

illegal

counts

alleged

35

acts

conspiracies

to

commit

two

bookmaking
of

wire
and

fraud,
numbers

racketeering
murder.

The

3.

government

conceded

that

neither

defendant

posed

a

risk

of

flight, but moved for pretrial detention to assure the safety of
the community.
the

At a two-day evidenti ary hearing before the DC,

government

submitted

a

detailed

. proffer

of

ff-<.~

-

evidence

indicating the Salerno is the head of the Genovese family of the ~
New York Mafia, and that Cafaro is a "captain" in that family.
The

proffer

indicated

that

resps

used violence

to monopolize

illegal gambling activities, to operate a loansharking business,
and to control labor unions.

According to the evidence, Salerno

could order a murder by uttering the single word "hit."
Cafaro

conducted

the

day-to-day

operations

of

the

Petn Sa.

family

and

ordered the use of violence.
At

the

hearing

Salerno

contended

that

the

government's

witnesses were unreliable because of their criminal activities
and

because

government.

they

benefited

from

their

Salerno also proffered the

cooperation

with

the

testimony of witnesses

who would state that they did not consider him a danger to the
community, and a physician's letter stating that he suffered from
heart disease.

Cafaro proffered no evidence, but argued that the

government's tape recordings of his threats of violence did not

-·

r~

, . . . _ _ _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -,+<c.,,,-/'~3

prove that he had carried out any of his threats.

--

__,

The DC concluded that the government had shown by clear and

convincing evidence

-

that no combination of condi tions--such as

house arrest and an order not to commit crimes--would reasonably
ensure

the

safety

of

the

community.

family's

"illegal businesses,

constant

attention

and

The

DC

found

that

in place for many years,

protection,

or

they

will

the

require

fail."

and

,V-<'...

4.

"business as usual"

for

murder."

Resps asked the

Petn 6a.

resps "involves threats, beatings, and
trial

judge to review the

pretrial detention order, but she concluded that de novo review
was inappropriate,

and found no new evidence warranting resps'

release.

/2--\J

A divided CA2 panel reversetl-.
herself

and

imperative

Judge

that

Newman,

punishment

conviction,

and

punishment.

Chief

relies
shall

concludes
Judge

Judge Kearse' s opinion, for
upon

not

be

the

constitutional "1,,c..O
~
imposed except upon ~ - J . .

preventive

that

Feinberg's

dissent

-

detention

reasons

that

~

~~

the

interest in protecting society from adult crime is, if anything,
even greater than the interest in protecting it against juvenile
crime.

In

provide

constitutionally adequate

his

view,

the

procedures

set

out

in

the

protection against

statute

erroneous

deprivations of liberty.

II. DISCUSSION

Although this is a very important case, it does not appear
to

be

an

unusually

difficult

one

for

you.

You

agree

that

preventive detention serves a compelling government interest in
preventing crime, and that a prediction of future dangerousness
based on adequate procedures is not arbitrary.

A.
Salerno,

Mootness.
and

The newspapers

reported some

possibly Cafaro as well,

sentenced on other charges.
possibility that

None of

that ~

has been convicted and
the briefs discusses

this has mooted the case.

subject of questioning at oral argument.

time ago

This

k

/-"'
··~
--==
the

should be a

~

5.
Id

The controversy is
.
Y\b y
review

brought

t h"1.s Court.

to

trial

detention.
Court

one capable
Pretrial

quickly

In Schall v.

considered

the

to

of

detainees

shorten

Martin, 467

New

York

repetition yet

the

are

evading

supposed to be

period

of

pretrial

U.S. 253, 280 ( 1984), the

courts'

"liberal

view

of

the

doctrine of 'capable of repetition, yet evading review'" as one
of

several

features

of

the

New York

law

that

satisfied

the

requirements of procedural due process.
Resps, however, may not be able to satisfy the requirement
of City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983), that there
be a real and immediate threat that they will again be subject to
preventive detention.

Apparently

there

is

no likelihood that

Salerno, at least, will finish serving his sentence in the near
future.

It

damages,

although

it

would

immune.

Perhaps resps have a

be

may

be

that

resps wish

seems

clear

to

that

pursue an
the

action for

officials

involved

sufficient interest in

erasing the stigma that attaches to a judicial finding that they
are dangerous to the community.
great

importance

event,

now

that

they

Of course this does not seem of
have

been

convicted.

In

any

a decision on the constitutional issue would not affect

any of the DC's factual findings.
Resps may attempt to argue that a decision in this case will

~
- -------------------------------------------------------

have some effect on their application for release pending appeal
of their convictions.
Of course

a

person's protected interest in liberty is greatly

diminished by
Reform Act,

I doubt that such an argument has merit.

conviction of

moreover,

a

serious

the standards for

crime.

Under

the Bai 1

release on appeal are

6.

much stricter than those for release before trial.

A convicted

person must show, by clear and convincing evidence, that he is
not

likely

to

community.

flee

or

pose

a

danger

Section 3143{b) (1).

to

the

safety

of

the

Resps also must show that the

appeal is not for the purpose of delay and raises "a substantial
question of law or fact likely to result in reversal or an order
for a new trial."

Section 3143{b) (2).

It is possible, however,

that a Court decision invalidating the procedures at the pretrial
detention hearing would be relevant to the procedures at a postconviction hearing.
In

sum,

I

--

think

this case may be moot,
...-

although I

await

instruction from the parties at oral argument.

It may be that

this

bail,

question,

reviewable

only

like

other

if

the

greatest expedition.

questions

Court

regarding

hears

See Stack v.

and

decides

will

it with

be
the

Boy le, 3 42 U.S. 1, 4 { 1951)

{granting cert. and deciding merits at the same time).

B. The Merits.
1. Substantive Due Process.

The point of departure is

v:s'chall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 {1984), in which you joined CHIEF
JUSTICE REHNQUIST' s opinion for the Court upholding a New York
statute authorizing ~
opinion

accepts

as

trial de~
"axiomatic"

Process Clause forbids

n of juv~
the

proposition

serves

detention
a

of

"legitimate

The Schall

that

the

punishment except upon conviction.

Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 {1979).
pretrial

.

juveniles
and

is

not

compelling"

Due
See

Schall concludes that
punishment because

government

interest

it
in

7.

protecting society from crime,

and also serves to protect

juvenile

from

The

features

of

his

the

own

New

folly.

York

law:

Court

there

relied

is no

upon

the

several

indication in

the

statute that preventive detention is intended as punishment; the
detention lasts no longer than 17 days; juveniles often, although
not always, are detained in "halfway houses" rather than prisons.
Moreover,
some

every state

form

of

and

juvenile

the District

pretrial

of

Columbia authorizes

detention,

thus

negating

the

argument that the practice offends deeply-rooted traditions.
This
does

case

not

is more difficult

recognize

adults from

a

government

than Schall.

(B:~aj

interest

protecting

in

the consequences of their own folly.

society
sane

~ ~ he

period of pretrial detention, though limited by the Speedy Trial
Act,

will

often exceed the basic 90-day period established by

that Act because much pretrial time is "excludable" under that
Act.

~ al though

prisoners,
Fourth,

they are

pretrial

not

preventive

detainees

placed in

detention

of

are

non-secure
adults

is

segregated

from

half-way houses.
a

relatively

new

practice, and is a departure from the traditional principle that
a criminal defendant is considered innocent until proven guilty.
Only

five

states

in

addition

to

the

authorize preventive detention of adults.

,,compelling

"'

District

of

Columbia

-

On the other hand, the

------

______________

interest in protecting society from crime is present,

--------------------------------...

and preventive detention is available only for the most serious
crimes,

and

only

on

a

likely to be effective.

showing

that

no lesser

restriction

is

a.
Perhaps

the

constitutionality

-

Newman.
not

strongest

of

preventive

detention

against

is

made

by

~--------·------

Judge

1.

First, Judge Newman notes that detaining a person who is ~ -

accused

any

of

crime

-

based

on

a

--------~·-------

dangerousness would
would

--

argument

serve

society.

the

violate

compelling

due

prediction

process,

government

even

of

though

interest

in

'

it

also

protecting

Judge Newman argues that this logically implies that

detaining a person who is accused of a crime for the same reason
is equally invalid.
Gerstein v.

Pugh,

The probable cause determination required by
420 U.S. 103

(1975),

defendants apart from other citizens.
some

evidence

committed
arrest

by

and

liberty. 11

of

dangerousness

recidivists).

indictment
Petn 19a.

(because

II

some

sets criminal

For one thing, it provides

Moreover,

justify

however,

so

many

crimes

are

as Judge

Newman admits,

regulatory

curtailment of

Suspects may be detained long enough to

hold a pretrial hearing; afterwards they may be detained in order
to ensure their appearance at trial, Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.
520,

534

(1979),

witnesses.

or

to

prevent

them

from

tampering

with

To be sure, these restrictions may be distinguished

on the ground that they are all related to the crime with which
the defendant is charged;

however,

they are

also

non-punitive

restrictions on liberty imposed prior to conviction.
It is difficult
detention
example,

is
if

to maintain the position

constitutionally

forbidden

it

that

were

known

in

members

that preventive
all

cases.

For

of

organization would carry out bombing
while awaiting trial, detention would seem to be justified even

~

9.

if it the terrorists were likely to appear for trial.

Of course

this example merely raises the social "costs" of pretrial release
to a very high level.

It is still possible to argue, as does

Judge Kearse, that surveillance and an accelerated trial schedule
are the only remedies.

It is clear, however, that such remedies

will be inadequate in many cases.
On

balance,

I

think

detention statute,

a

carefully

circumscribed preventive

such as this one, is not so shocking to the

conscience as to violate substantive due process.
2.
that

Procedural Due Process.

"from a

legal

point

of

In Schall, the Court concluded
there

view

is nothing inherently

unattainable about a prediction of future criminal conduct."
U.S.,

at 278,

citing Jurek v.

Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 274

467

(1976)

(opinion of Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ).
Of course there is a determination of probable cause at a
preliminary

hearing.

The

Bail

Reform

Act

also

provides

the

extensive procedural safeguards outlined above, and provides that
the

hearing

attentive

shall

be

held

promptly.

different

clearly

was

to the need to provide procedural safeguards against

erroneous deprivations of liberty.
additional

Congress

procedures
margin

of

that
safety

It is difficult to think of

would
for

provide

defendants.

a

significantly
Indeed,

resps'

argument on this issue mostly confines itself to an unconvincing,
and basically irrelevant, discussion of the alleged vagueness of
the standard.

III. CONCLUSION

10.

Society has a strong interest in protecting itself against
the relatively small number of criminals who commit a relatively
large share of the serious crimes.

Congress has enacted a novel,

carefully circumscribed statute, based on extensive legislative
i.----

findings,

- - -

with considerable potential

this small group.

for

preventing crimes by

In this situation the Court should hesitate to

interpose a constitutional barrier to the legislative goal.
I

am

detention
more

concerned,
of

competent adults is

sweeping statute

protection

that

however,

against

popular support.

and

preventive

"playing with fire."

also would serve

crime,

permitting

would

A much

the public interest in
no

doubt

receive

great

On this score, it is ominous that Korematsu v.

United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), the Japanese internment case,
is cited several times in the briefs.
to ensure
bounds.

that

the legislature does

Of course this Court sits
not exceed

constitutional

In this area, fine gradations may make a constitutional

difference.

For

example,

the

statutory

"presumptions"

of

dangerousness, not at issue in this case, are troublesome and may
warrant separate consideration in a later case.

---

I recommend that you vote to reverse the judgment of CA2.
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SUPREME COURT OF fflE UNITED STATES
No. 86-87

UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. ANTHONY
SALERNO AND VINCENT CAFARO
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
· [February - , 1987]

CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the
Court.
The Bail Reform Act of 1984 allows a federal court to detain an arrestee pending trial if the government demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence after an adversary
hearing that no release conditions "will reasonably assure
... the safety of any other person and the community." The
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit struck
down this provision of the Act as facially unconstitutional,
because, in that court's words, this type of pretrial detention
violates "substantive due process." We granted certiorari
because of a conflict among the Courts of Appeals regarding
(1986). We hold
the validity of the Act. 1 479 U.S. that the Act fully comports with constitutional requirements,
and we therefore reverse.
I
Responding to "the alarming problem of crimes committed
by persons on release," S. Rep. No. 98-225, p. 3 (1983), Con1

Every other Court of Appeals to have considered the validity of the
Bail Reform Act of 1984 has rejected the facial constitutional challenge.
United States v. Walker, 805 F . 2d 1042 (CAll 1986); United States v.
Rodriguez, 803 F . 2d 1102 (CAll 1986); United States v. Simpkins, U. S.
App. D. C. , 801 F . 2d 520 (1986); United States v. Zannino , 798 F . 2d
544 (CAl 1986); United States v. Perry, 788 F. 2d 100 (CA3), cert. denied,
479 U. S. (1986); United States v. Portes, 786 F. 2d 758 (CA7 1985).
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gress formulated the Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U. S. C.
§ 3141 et seq. (1982 ed., Supp. III), as the solution to a bail
crisis in the federal courts. The Act represents the National
Legislature's considered response to numerous perceived deficiencies in the federal bail process. By providing for
sweeping changes in both the way federal courts consider bail
applications and the circumstances under which bail is
granted, Congress hoped to "give the courts adequate au- 1
thority to make release decisions that give appropriate recognition to the danger a person may pose to others if released."
S. Rep. No. 98-225, p. 3.
To this end, § 3141(a) of the Act requires a judicial officer
to determine whether an arrestee shall be detained. Section
3142(e) provides that "[i]f, after a hearing pursuant to the
provisions of subsection (f), the judicial officer finds that no
condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure
the appearance of the person as required and the safety of
any other person and the community, he shall order the
detention of the person prior to trial." Section 3142(f) provides the arrestee with a number of procedural safeguards.
He may request the presence of counsel at the detention
hearing, he may testify and present witnesses in his behalf,
as well as proffer evidence, and he may cross-examine other
witnesses appearing at the hearing. If the judicial officer
finds that no conditions of pretrial release can reasonably assure the safety of other persons and the community, he must
state his findings of fact in writing, § 3142(i), and support his
conclusion with "clear and convincing evidence," § 3142(f).
The judicial officer is not ·ven unbrid d d' retion in
making the detention determina 10n. Congress has specified
the considerations relevant to that decision. These factors
include the ~ ature and seriousness of the charges, the
~ bstantialityL the government's evidence against the
arres~, the arrestee's background and characteristics, and
the 'tfature and seriousness of the danger posed by the suspect' s release. § 3142(g). Should a judicial officer order
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detention, the detainee is entitled to expedited appellate review of the detention order. §§ 3145(b), (c).
Respondents Anthony Salerno and Vincent Cafaro were
arrested on March 21, 1986, after being charged in a 29-count
indictment alleging various Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) violations, mail and wire
fraud offenses, extortion, and various criminal gambling violations. The RICO counts alleged 35 acts of racketeering
activity, including fraud, extortion, gambling, and conspiracy
to commit murder. At respondents' arraignment, the Government moved to have Salerno and Cafaro detained pursuant to § 3142(e), on the ground that no condition of release
would assure the safety of the community or any person.
The District Court held a hearing at which the Government
made a detailed proffer of evidence. The Government's case
showed that Salerno was the "boss" of the Genovese Crime
Family of La Costra Nostra and that Cafaro was a "captain"
in the Genovese Family. According to the Government's
proffer, based in large part on conversations intercepted by a
court-ordered wiretap, the two respondents had participated
in wide-ranging conspiracies to aid their illegitimate enterprises through violent means. The Government also offered
the testimony of two of its trial witnesses, who would assert
that Salerno personally participated in two murder conspiracies. Salerno opposed the motion for detention, challenging
the credibility of the Government's witnesses. He offered
the testimony of several character witnesses as well as a letter from his doctor stating that he was suffering from a serious medical condition. Cafaro presented no evidence at the
hearing, but instead characterized the wiretap conversations
as merely "tough talk."
The District Court granted the Government's detention
motion, concluding that the Government had established by
clear and convincing evidence that no condition or combination of conditions of release would ensure the safety of the
communit~, or any person:
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"The activities of a criminal organization such as the
Genovese Family do not cease with the arrest of its principals and their release on even the most stringent of bail
conditions. The illegal businesses, in place for many
years, require constant attention and protection, or they
will fail. Under these circumstances, this court recognizes a strong incentive on the part of its leadership to
continue business as usual. When business as usual involves threats, beatings, and murder, the present danger such people pose in the community is self-evident."
631 F. Supp. 1364, 1375 (SDNY 1986).
Respondents appealed, contending that to the extent that
the Bail Reform Act permits pretrial detention on the ground
that the arrestee is likely to commit future crimes, it is
unconstitutional on its face. Over a dissent, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed. 794
F. 2d 64 (1986). Although the court agreed that pretrial detention could be imposed if the defendants were likely to intimidate witnesses or otherwise jeopardize the trial process,
it found"§ 3142(e)'s authorization of pretrial detention [on the
ground of future dangerousness] repugnant to the concept of
substantive due process, which we believe prohibits the total
deprivation of liberty simply as a means of preventing future
crimes." Id., at 71-72. The court concluded that the Government could not, consistent with due process, detain persons who had not been accused of any crime merely because
they were thought to present a danger to the community.
Id., at 72, quoting United States v. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.
2d 984, 1000-1001 (CA2 1986) (opinion of Newman, J.). It
reasoned that our criminal law system holds persons accountable for past actions, not anticipated future actions. Although a court could detain an arrestee who threatened to
flee before trial, such detention would be permissible because
it would serve the basic objective of a criminal systembringing the accused to trial. The court distinguished our
decisio11 in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103 (1975), in which
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we upheld police detention pursuant to arrest. The court
construed Gerstein as limiting such detention to the "'administrative steps incident to arrest."' 794 F . 2d, at 74, quoting
Gerstein, 420 U. S., at 114. The Court of Appeals also found
our decision in Schall v. Martin , 467 U. S. 253 (1984),
upholding postarrest pretrial detention of juveniles, inapp_osite because juveniles have a lesser interest in liberty than do
adults. The dissenting judge concluded that on its face, the
Bail Reform Act adequately balanced the Federal Government's compelling interests in public safety against the detainee's liberty interests.

II
A facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the most
difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger
must establish that no set of circumstances exists under
which the Act would be valid. The fact that the Bail Reform
Act might operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable
set of circumstances is insufficient to render it wholly invalid,
since we have not recognized an "overbreadth" doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment. Schall v.
Martin , supra, at 269, n. 18. We think respondents have
failed to shoulder their heavy burden to demonstrate that the
Act is "facially" unconstitutional. 2
Respondents present two grounds for invalidating the Bail
Reform Act's provisions permitting pretrial detention on the
basis of future dangerousness. First, they rely upon the
Court of Appeals' conclusion that the Act exceeds the limitations placed upon the Federal Government by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Second, they contend
that the Act contravenes the Eighth Amendment's pr?scrip2
We intimate no view on the validity of any aspects of the Act that are
not relevant to respondents' case. Nor have respondents claimed that the
Act is unconstitutional because of the way it was applied to the particular
facts of their case.

h
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tion against excessive bail.
turn.

We treat these contentions in
A

The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides
that "No person shall ... be deprived oflife, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... " This Court has held
that the Due Process Clause protects individuals against two
types of government action. So-called "substantive due
process" prevents the government from engaging in conduct
that "shocks the conscience," Rochin v. California, 342 U. S.
165, 172 (1952), or interferes with rights "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319,
325-326 (1937). When government action depriving a person of life, liberty, or property survives substantive due
process scrutiny, it must still be implemented in a fair manner. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 335 (1976). This
requirement has traditionally been referred to as "procedural" due process.
Respondents first argue that the Act violates substantive
due process because the pretrial detention it authorize~ onstitutes impermissible punishment before trial. SeeYBell v.
Wolfish , 441 U. S. 520, 535, an n. 16 (1979). The Government, however, has never argued that pretrial detention
could be upheld if it were "punishment." The Court of
Appeals assumed that pretrial detention under the Bail Reform Act is ~egulatory; 'n'ot penal} and we agree that it is.
As an initia!maUer, themere fact that a person is detained
does not inexorably lead to the conclusion that the government has imposed punishment. Bell v. Wolfish, supra, at
537. To determine whether a restriction on liberty consti-:
tutes impermissible punishment or permissible regulation,
we first look to legislative intent. Schall v. Martin, 467
U. S., at 269. Unless Congress expressly intended to impose punitive restrictions, the punitive/regulatory distinction
turns on "'whether an alternative purpose to which [the

J
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restriction] may rationally be connected is assignable for it,
and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned [to it]."' Ibid., quoting Kennedy v.
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U. S. 144, 168-169 (1963).
We conclude that the detention imposed by the Act falls on
the regulatory side of the dichotomy. The legislative history
of the Bail Reform Act clearly indicates that Congress did not
formulate the pretrial detention provisions as punishment for
dangerous individuals. See S. Rep. No. 98-225, p. 8. Congress instead perceived pretrial detention as a potential solution to a pressing societal problem. Id., at 4-7. There is no
doubt that preventing danger to the community is a legitimate regulatory goal. Schall v. Martin, supra.
Nor are the incidents of pretrial detention excessive in
relation to the regulatory goal Congress sought to achieve.
The Bail Reform Act carefully limits the circumstances under
which detention may be sought to the most serious of crimes.
See 18 U. S. C. § 3142(f) (detention hearings available if case
involves crimes of violence, offenses for which the sentence is
life imprisonment or death, serious drug offenses, or certain
repeat offenders). The arrestee is entitled to a prompt
detention hearing, ibid. and the maximum length of pretrial
detention is limited by the stringent time limitations of the
Speedy Trial Act. See 18 U. S. C. §3161 et seq. (1982 ed.
and Supp. III). Moreover, as in Schall v. Martin, the conditions of confinement envisioned by the Act "appear to reflect
the regulatory purposes relied upon by the" government.
467 U. S., at 270. As in Schall, the statute at issue here requires that detainees be housed in a "facility separate, to the
extent practicable, from persons awaiting or serving sentences or being held in• custody pending appeal." 18
U. S. C. § 3142(i)(2). We conclude, therefore, that the pretrial detention contemplated by the Bail Reform Act i ~ lat.Q!Yjn nature, and does not constitute punishment before
trial in violation of the ue rocess Clause.
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The Court of Appeals nevertheless concluded that "the
Due Process Clause prohibits pretrial detention on the
ground of danger to the community as a regulatory measure,
without regard to the duration of the detention." 794 F. 2d,
at 71. Respondents characterize the Due Process Clause as
erecting an impenetrable "wall" in this area that "no governmental interest-rational, important, compelling or otherwise-may surmount." Brief for Respondents 16.
We do not think the Clause lays down any such categorical
imperative. We have repeatedly held that the government's
regulatory interest in community safety can, in appropriate
circumstances, outweigh an individual's liberty interest.
For example, in times of war or insurrection, when society's
interest is at its peak, the government may detain individuals
whom the government believes to be dangerous. See
Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U. S. 160 (1948) (approving
unreviewable Executive power to detain enemy aliens in time
of war); Moyerv. Peabody, 212 U. S. 78, 84-85 (1909) (rejecting due process claim of individual jailed without probable
cause by Governor in time of insurrection). Even outside
the exigencies of war, we have found that sufficiently compelling governmental interests can justify detention of dangerous persons. Thus, we have found no absolute constitutional
barrier to detention of potentially dangerous resident aliens
pending deportation proceedings. Carlson v. Landon, 342
U. S. 524, 537-542 (1952); Wong Wing v. United States, 163
U. S. 228 (1896). We have also held that the government
may detain mentall~nstable individuals who present a danger to the public, 'Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S. 418 (1979),
and dangerous defendants who become incompetent to stand
trial, Jackson v. Indiana, 406 . U. S. 715, 731-739 (1972);
Greenwood v. United States, 350 U. S. 366 (1956). We have
approved of postarrest regulatory detention of juveniles
when they present a continuing danger to the community.
Schall v. Martin, supra. Even competent adults may face
substantial liberty restrictions as a result of the operation of
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our criminal justice system. If the police suspect an individual of a crime, they may arrest and hold him until a neutral
magistrate determines whether probable cause exists.
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103 (1975). Finally, respondents concede and the Court of Appeals noted that an arrestee
may be incarcerated until trial if he presents a risk of flight,
see Bell v. W ol.fish, 441 U. S., at 534, or a danger to
witnesses.
Respondents characterize all of these cases as exceptions
to the "general rule" of substantive due process that the
government may not detain a person prior to a judgment of
guilt in a criminal trial. Such a "general rule" may freely be
conceded, but we think that these cases show a sufficient
number of exceptions to the rule that the congressional action
challenged here can hardly be characterized as totally novel.
Given the well-established authority of the government, in
special circumstances, to restrain individuals' liberty prior to
or even without criminal trial and conviction, we think that
the present statute providing for pretrial detention on the
basis of dangerousness must be evaluated in precisely the
same manner that we evaluated the laws in the cases discussed above.
The government's interest in preventing crime by arrestees is b o ~ compelling. De Veau v. Braisted,
363 U. S. 144, 155 (1960). lnScfiall, supra, we recognized
the strength of the State's interest in preventing juvenile
crime. This general concern with crime prevention is no less
compelling when the suspects are adults. Indeed, "[t]he
harm suffered by the victim ~rime is not dependent upon
the age of the perpetrator." Schall v. Martin, 467 U. S., at
264-265. The Bail Reform Actotl984 responds to an even
· more particularized governmental interest than the interest
we sustained in Schall. The statute we upheld in Schall permitted pretrial detention of any juvenile arrested on any
charge after a showing that the individual might commit
some undefined further crimes. The Bail Reform Act, in
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contrast, narrowly focuses on a particularly acute problem in
which the government interests are overwhelming. The Act )
operates only on individuals who have been arrested for a
spec1 c ca egory o extreme y serious enses. 18 . S. C.
§ 31
on ess pee ca y
n
t these individuals
are far more likely to be responsible for dangerous acts in the
community after arrest. See S. Rep. No. 98-225, pp. 6-7.
Nor is the Act by any means a scattershot attempt to incapacitate those who are merely suspected of these serious
crimes. The government must first of all demonstrate probable cause to believe that the charged crime has been committed by the arrestee, but that is not enough. In a fullblown adversary hearing, the government must convince a
neutral decisionmaker by clear and convincing evidence that
no conditions of release can reasonably assure the safety of
the community or any person. 18 U. S. C. § 3142(f). While
the government's general interest in preventing crime is
compelling, even this interest is heightened when the government musters convincing proof that the arrestee, already indicted or held to answer for a serious crime, presents a demonstrable danger to the community. Under these narrow
circumstances, society's interest in crime prevention is at its
greatest.
On the other side of the scale, of course, is the individual's
stron interest in liberty. We do not minimize the importance an fun ame tal nature of this right. But, as our
cases hold, th~
, in circumstances where the government's interest is sufficiently weighty, be subordinated to
the greater needs of society. We think th~
careful delineation of the circumstances under which detention
will be permitted satisfies this standard. When the government proves by clear and convincing evidence that an
arrestee presents an identified and articulable threat to an
individual or the community, we believe that, consistent with
the Due Process Clause, a court may disable the arrestee
from executing that threat. Under these circumstances, we
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cannot categorically state that pretrial detention "offends
some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental." Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97, 105 (1934).
"Given the legitimacy of the [government's] interest in preventive detention, and the nonpunitive nature of that detention, the remaining question is whether the procedures afforded . . . provide sufficient protection against erroneous
and unnecessary deprivations of liberty. See ½t-1athews v.
Eldridge, 424 U. S., at 335." Schall, supra, at 274. We
think that the procedures enumerated in the Bail Reform Act
satisfy the requirements of procedural due process. As we
stated in Schall, "there is nothing inherently unattainable
about~ prediction of future criminal conduct." Id., at 278;
see vfurek v. Texas, 428 U. S. 262, 274 (1976) (opinion of
Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.); id., at 279 (WHITE, J.,
concurring in judgment). Under the Bail Reform Act, the
procedures by which a judicial officer evaluates the likelihood
of future dangerousness are specifically designed to further
the accuracy of that determination. Detainees have a right
to counsel at the detention hearing. 18 U. S. C. § 3142(f).
They may testify in their own behalf, present information by
proffer or otherwise, and cross-examine witnesses who
appear at the hearing. Ibid. These procedures ensure the
accuracy of the information flowing to the decisionmaker.
The judicial officer charged with the responsibility of
determining the appropriateness of detention is guided by
statutorily enumerated factors, which include the nature and
the circumstances of the charges, the weight of the evidence,
the history and characteristics of the putative offender, and
the danger to the community. § 3142(g). By explicitly stating the relevant considerations, Congress has reduced the
possibility that a judicial officer will order detention on facts
not relevant to the government's compelling interest in preventing danger to the community. The chances of an
erroneous decision are further reduced by the Act's require-
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ment that the government prove its case by clear and convincing evidence, id., § 3142(f). Finally, the judicial officer
must include written findings of fact and a written statement
of reasons for a decision to detain.
§ 3142(i).
This
requirement, combined with the Act's prompt review provisions, § 3145(c), provides for effective and immediate
appellate review of the detention decision, further reducing
the possibility of an erroneous deprivation of liberty.
We think these extensive safeguards provide ample protections to arrestees subject to detention under the Act. The
protections are more exacting than those we found sufficient
in the juvenile context, see Schall, 467 U. S., at 275-281, and
they far exceed what we found necessary to effect limited
postarrest detention in Y.ferstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103
(1975). We think respondents "have failed to note any additional procedures that would significantly improve the accuracy of the determination without unduly impinging on the
achievement of legitimate state purposes." Schall, supra,
at 277. Given legitimate and compelling regulatory purpose
of the Act and the procedural protections it offers, we conclude that the Act is not invalid under the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
B
Respondents also contend that the Bail Reform Act violates the Excessive Bail Clause of the Eighth Amendment.
The Court of Appeals did not address this issue because it
found that the Act violates the Due Process Clause. We
think that the Act survives a challenge founded upon the
Eighth Amendment.
The Eighth Amendment addresses pretrial release by providing merely that "Excessive bail shall not be required."
This Clause, of course, says nothing about whether bail shall
be available at all. Respondents nevertheless contend that
this Clause grants them a right to bail calculated solely upon
considerations of flight. They rely on Stack v. Boyle, 342
U. S. 1, 5 (1951), in which the Court stated that "Bail set at a
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figure higher than an amount reasonably calculated [to
ensure the defendant's presence at trial] is 'excessive' under
the Eighth Amendment." In respondents' view, since the
Bail Reform Act allows a court essentially to set bail at an
infinite amount for reasons not related to the risk of flight, it
violates the Excessive Bail Clause. Respondents concede
that the right to bail they have discovered in the Eighth
Amendment is not absolute. A court may, for example,
refuse bail in capital cases. And, as the Court of Appeals
noted and respondents admit, a court may refuse bail when
the defendant presents a threat to the judicial process by
intimidating witnesses. Brief for Respondents 21-22. Respondents characterize these exceptions as consistent with
what they claim to be the sole purpose of bail-to ensure integrity of the judicial process.
While we agree that a primary function of bail is to safeguard the courts' role in adjudicating the guilt or innocence of
defendants, we reject the proposition that the Eighth
Amendment categorically prohibits the government from
pursuing other admittedly compelling interests through
regulation of pretrial release. The above-quoted dicta in
Stack v. Boyle is far too slender a reed on which to rest this
argument. The Court in Stack had no occasion to consider
whether the Excessive Bail Clause requires courts to admit
all defendants to bail, because the statute before the Court in
that case in fact allowed the defendants to be bailed. Thus,
the Court had to determine only whether bail, admittedly
available in that case, was excessive if set at a sum greater
than that necessary to ensure the arrestees' presence at trial.
The holding of Stack is illuminated by the Court's holding
just four months later in Carlson v. Landon, 342 U. S. 524
(1952). In that case, r e m a ~ a r to the present
action, the detainees had b ~ n d held without bail
pending a determination of deportability. The Attorney
General refused to release the individuals, "on the ground
that there was reasonable cause to believe that [their] release

?
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would be prejudicial to the public interest and would endanger the welfare and safety of the United States." Id., at 529
(emphasis added). The detainees brought the same challenge that respondents bring to us today: the Eighth Amendment required them to be admitted to bail. The Court
squarely rejected this proposition:
"The bail clause was lifted with slight changes from
the E~
s Act. In England that clause
has never been thought to accord a right to bail in all
cases, but merely to provide that bail shall not be excessive in those cases where it is p~
ail.
When this clause was carried over into our Bill of Rights,
nothing was said that indicated any different concept.
The Eighth Amendment has not prevented Congress
from defining the classes of cases in which bail shall be
allowed in this country. Thus, in criminal cases bail is
not compulsory where the punishment may be death.
Indeed, the very language of the Amendment fails to say
all arrests must be bailable." Id., at 545-546 (footnotes
omitted).
Carlson v. Landon was a civil case, and we need not decide
today whether the Excessive Bail Clause speaks at all to
Congress' power to define the classes of criminal arrestees
who shall be admitted to bail. For even if we were to conclude that the Eighth Amendment imposes some substantive
limitations on the National Legislature's powers in this area,
we would still hold that the Bail Reform Act is valid. Nothing in the text of the Bail Clause limits permissible government considerations solely to questions of flight. The only
arguable substantive limitation of the Bail Clause is that the
government's proposed conditions of release or detention not
be "excessive" in light of the perceived evil. Of course, to
determine whether the government's response is excessive,
we must compare that response against the interest the government seeks to protect by means of that response. Thus,
when the government has admitted that its only interest is in
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preventing flight, bail must be set by a court at a sum
designed to ensure that goal, and no more. Stack v. Boyle,
supra. We believe that when Congress has mandated detention on the basis of a compelling interest other than prevention of flight, as it has here, the Eighth Amendment does
not require release on bail.

III
In our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to
trial or without trial isttie car fully limited exception. We
hold that the provisions for pretrial detention in the Bail
Reform Act of 1984 fall within that carefully limited exception. The Act authorizes the detention prior to trial of
arrestees charged with serious felonies who are found after
an adversary hearing to pose a threat to the safety of individuals or to the community which no condition of release can
dispel. The numerous procedural safeguards detailed above
must attend this adversary hearing. We are unwilling to
say that this congressional determination, based as it is upon
that primary concern of every government-a concern for the
safety and indeed the lives of its citizens-on its face violates
either the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment or the
Excessive Bail Clause of the Eighth Amendment.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore
Reversed.
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February 19, 1987
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Dear Chief:

l?lease -join me.
Sincerely,

The Chief .Just ice

l!p/ss
cc:

The Conference

.jn.vrtntt <lfoud d
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Jlu!fittgtou, J. <If. 2.llp,.,
CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

February 19, 1987

Re:

86-87

U.S. v. Salerno and Cafaro

\

Dear Chief,
I had thought the only thing actually
decided by CA2 and which we needed to address was
whether "the total deprivation of liberty as a means
of preventing future crime exceeds the substantive
limitations of the Due Process Clause." 794 F.2d 64,
72. I assumed we did not need to decide any
procedural Due Process issue. Your opinion indicates
"we think that the procedures enumerated in the Bail
Reform Act satisfy the requirements of procedural due
process." p.11. Because I have concerns about the
procedural provisions of the Act, I plan to concur in
the judgment and perhaps Parts I and IIB.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

<qaurl 1tf tltt ~nitn j;bdts
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CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

February 20, 1987

Re:

86-87 - United States v. Salerno

Dear Chief:
I shall wait for Thurgood's dissent.
Respectfully,

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

~u.prtntt ~Dltri of tltt ~ h .itafts

~ufringhtn. ~--~-
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CHAMl!IERS 01'

THE CHIEF" JUSTICE

February 23, 1987

Re:

86-87

United States v. Salerno and Cafaro

Dear Sandra,
I agree with you the only thing decided by CA2 in this
case was whether any system resulting in confinement prior
to trial was valid under the Due Process Clause, but I think
the reason that that was the only question that they reached
was because they concluded that no such scheme could be
valid. Having come to the opposite conclusion, it seems to
me perfectly logical that we should go on and evaluate the
procedural guarantees contained in the statute, rather than
sending the question back to the same panel of CA2 which
declared the whole thing unconstitutional.
I think it is important to have as strong an opinion as
possible in a case like this, and I would hope that it would
not be weakened by separate writing on the part of those who
are in basic agreement any more than is absolutely
necessary. If you have misgivings about any of the language
in parts I and IIB, I would be happy to consider any
suggestions that you have~
Since Byron and Lewis have already joined my draft, I
am sending them copies of this letter.
Sinc?ly,

/!J;~
cc: Justice White
Justice Powell

Jn.vrtutt ~ond ~

t41 ~ittb Jbdt.s'
J}a.-frbtgton. Jl. ~. 2.llp,.,

CHAMBER S Of"

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

February 24, 1987

Re:

86-87

U.S. v. Salerno and Cafaro

Dear Chief,
The Solicitor General stated several times during
the oral argument that procedural due process issues were
not to be resolved in this case. In my view there may be
some procedural weaknesses and I am not prepared under the
circumstances to express blanket approval for them.
Your discussion of procedural due process begins
with the first full paragraph on page 11 and continues until
Part IIB on page 12. One suggestion, if you want to retain
all of that discussion, would be to break it out as a
separate subsection and I could join the rest of the
opinion.
An alternative suggestion would be to omit the
first two full sentences on page 11, with the accompanying
references, and the first full paragraph on page 12, and to
insert on page 11 as a lead-in to the discussion of
procedures something along the following lines:
"This case does not raise the question
whether the procedures of the Bail Reform Act
provide sufficient protection against erroneous
and unnecessary deprivations of liberty." See
Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S., at 335. Numerous
procedural protections are built into the Act."
... [insert the balance of page 11 to the end
of the runover paragraph on page 12) Whether
these procedures are sufficient given the serious
liberty interest at stake, however, must be
addressed in future cases."
With changes along these lines I would be willing
to join all of your opinion. In either event, I suggest the

second to last sentence in the opinion be changed to refer
only to substantive due process.
I expect Nino and Harry may also suggest some
changes. You may decide to wait until you have all the
suggestions before considering any changes.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
Copies to:

Justice White
Justice Powell

1
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CHAM!!IERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

March 2, 1987
r

Memorandum to the Conference
Re:

United States v. Salerno, No. 86-87.

There has been some discussion of the propriety of
reaching the procedural due process issues presented by this
case. The current circulating draft addresses the question,
although the Court of Appeals did not pass judgment on this
aspect of the case. I believe that it is entirely proper
and indeed desirable to pass upon the fac·a1 validity of the
mai.11 thrust o the Act, which in my view inc udes he
procedural question.
Initially, I believe that the Court of Appeals'
majority opinion certainly hints at how that court would
resolve the procedural issue. Admittedly, the majority
opinion states rather unequivocally that "the total
deprivation of liberty as a means of preventing future crime
exceeds the substantive limitations of the Due Process
Clause." 794 F. 2d 64, 72. The opinion also states that a
program of incarcerating persons not accused of any crime
"would be constitutionally infirm, not for lack of
procedural due process," id., but because of substantive
limitations. But the majority opinion is not entirely
without reference to the procedural aspects of the case.
For example, in countering the government's argument below
that the mere fact of arrest would justify detention, the
majority opinion states:
"Moreover, if the arrest is thought to reflect that the
person is more deserving of confinement than members of
the public not accused of crime, the confinement would
offend the procedural component of due process by
dispensing with the procedural guarantees of the Fifth
and Sixth Amendments that must be observed before past
•conduct may justify incarceration on grounds of
dangerousness." Id.

;I
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Chief Judge Feinberg was persuaded by the procedural aspects
of the case, devoting a substantial discussion to the topic.

E.-

The issue was
ly briefed y the parties in our
Court. The governm nt devotes a ull fifteen pages to
whether the Bail Ref
- A~ strikes the proper balance
between the defendant's liberty interest and the the
government's interest in prevention of future crime.
Respondents understandably devote eighteen pages to argument
that the Act is invalid on procedural due process grounds.
I think that the procedural issue, which I see as part
and parcel of the general claim of unconstitutionality, was
fully presented below and here. I do not find it surprising
that the parties have devoted such energy to the prycedural
issue, as this case is in the same posture as was/Schall v.
Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984), when it came before us. There,
the CA2 held that §320.5(3) (b) of the New York Family Court
Act was unconstitutional as to all juveniles because the
statute authorized punitive pretrial detention. See 467
U.S., at 262. We rejected that substantive holding, and we
also found that the law satisfied procedural due process,
even though the CA2 had not explicitly reached that
question.
I believe that this case presents com ellin
pass upon the facial validity oft e ct, broa ly
There is certainly no jurisdictional bar to our
consideration of the procedural issue, because we would have
power to consider it even if it had not been raised below.
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 443 (1984). Under these
particular circumstances, considerations of judicial economy
justify reaching this purely legal issue. Nixon v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 743, n. 23 (1982). There is
nothing that further development in the CA2 would do to aid
our resolution of the procedural issue.
Moreover, I
believe that this is precisely the kind of case in which the
Court should endeavor to resolve, if at all possible, the
general validity of the Act. This is a question of obvious
importance to federal law enforcement--a question that we
saw as sufficiently weighty to justify expedited oral
argument. Given the importance of the issue and the purely
legal question before us, I think it proper and desirable to
rule on all of the constitutional questions presented.
If an opinion of this Court is to have any practical
applicability at all, it must treat the intertwined
su~stantive and procedural issues. A ruling that the Bail
Reform Act satisfies substantive due process would be
nothing more than a statement that under some undefined
hypothetical circumstances, the government may detain an

-

3 -

individual before trial on the ground of future
dangerousness. Such a holding would provide absolutely no
guidance to the lower courts regarding even the general
contours of the circumstances under which detention would be
valid. I believe the importance of this case lies not in a
ruling that broadly states that the government is not
completely disabled from effecting pretrial detention.
Rather, it is crucial to state that the limited
circumstances under which pretrial detention is available
and the extensive procedures surrounding the detention
decision are the factors that motivate our decision to hold
the Act valid.
Sincerely,

March 2, 1987
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United States

v. Salerno

Dear Chief:
I agree that we proper lv may reach the
process issue.

In my view, it fs 5mportant to do so.

Sincerely,

• The Chief Justice
LFP/vde

procedural due
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March 3, 1987

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

Re:

No. 86-87, United States v. Salerno

Dear Chief:
I join your opinion.
aural due process issues,
expand on this.

I am content to reach the procealthough others may wish you to

I have two minor concerns for your consideration.
The
first is the last sentence of the very first paragraph.
It
seems to me that when we say that the Act "fully comports
with constitutional requirements," we imply that the door is
closed against all possible challenges.
In a sense that is
somewhat inconsistent with footnote 2 on page 5.
Could the
sentence be softened somewhat so as to read, as a possible
example, "We hold that, as against the facial attack mounted
by these respondents, the Act •••• "?
At least something
along that line would be welcome to me.
My second concern is a preference that the discussion of
punishment v. regulation contain at least an intimation that
if detention continues too long, it can become excessive in
relation to the congressional goal and take on the attributes
of punishment. Do you think that the insertion of a comment
to this general effect would be useful?
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
cc: The Conference
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Marshall
Blackmun
Powell
Stevens
O'Connor
Scalia

From:

The Chief Justice
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 86-87
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UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. ANTHONY
SALERNO AND VINCENT CAFARO
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
[February - , 1987]

CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the
Court.
The Bail Reform Act of 1984 allows a federal court to detain an arrestee pending trial if the government demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence after an adversary
hearing that no release conditions "will reasonably assure
. . . the safety of any other person and the community." The
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit struck
down this provision of the Act as facially unconstitutional,
because, in that court's words, this type of pretrial detention
violates "substantive due process." We granted certiorari
because of a conflict among the Courts of Appeals regarding
the validity of the Act. 1 479 U.S. (1986). We hold
that, as against the facial attack mounted by these respondents, the Act fully comports with constitutional requirements. We therefore reverse.
Every other Court of Appeals to have considered the validity of the
Bail Reform Act of 1984 has rejected the facial constitutional challenge.
United States v. Halker, 805 F. 2d 1042 (CAll 1986); United States v.
Rodriguez , 803 F. 2d 1102 (CAll 1986); United States v. Simpkins , U. S.
App. D. C. - , 801 F . 2d 520 (1986); United States v. Zannino, 798 F . 2d
544 (CAl 1986); United States v. Perry, 788 F . 2d 100 (CA3), cert. denied ,
479 U. S. (1986); United States v. Pmes, 786 F . 2d 758 (CA7 1985).
1
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I
Responding to "the alarming problem of crimes committed
by persons on release," S. Rep. No. 98-225, p. 3 (1983), Congress formulated the Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U. S. C.
§ 3141 et seq. (1982 ed., Supp. III), as the solution to a bail
crisis in the federal courts. The Act represents the National
Legislature's considered response to numerous perceived deficiencies in the federal bail process. By providing for
sweeping changes in both the way federal courts consider bail
applications and the circumstances under which bail is
granted, Congress hoped to "give the courts adequate authority to make release decisions that give appropriate recognition to the danger a person may pose to others if released."
S. Rep. No. 98-225, p. 3.
To this end, § 3141(a) of the Act requires a judicial officer
to determine whether an arrestee shall be detained. Section
3142(e) provides that "[i]f, after a hearing pursuant to the
provisions of subsection (f), the judicial officer finds that no
condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure
the appearance of the person as required and the safety of
any other person and the community, he shall order the
detention of the person prior to trial." Section 3142(f) provides the arrestee with a number of procedural safeguards.
He may request the presence of counsel at the detention
hearing, he may testify and present witnesses in his behalf,
as well as proffer evidence, and he may cross-examine other
witnesses appearing at the hearing. If the judicial officer
finds that no conditions of pretrial release can reasonably assure the safety of other persons and the community, he must
state his findings of fact in writing, § 3142(i), and support his
conclusion with "clear and convincing evidence," § 3142(f).
The judicial officer is not given unbridled discretion in
making the detention determination. Congress· has specified
the considerations relevant to that decision. These factors
include the nature and seriousness of the charges, the
substantiality of the government's evidence against the
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arrestee, the arrestee's background and characteristics, and
the nature and seriousness of the danger posed by the suspect' s release. § 3142(g). Should a judicial officer order
detention, the detainee is entitled to expedited appellate review of the detention order. §§ 3145(b), (c).
Respondents Anthony Salerno and Vincent Cafaro were
arrested on March 21, 1986, after being charged in a 29-count
indictment alleging various Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) violations, mail and wire
fraud offenses, extortion, and various criminal gambling violations. The RICO counts alleged 35 acts of racketeering
activity, including fraud , extortion, gambling, and conspiracy
to commit murder. At respondents' arraignment, the Government moved to have Salerno and Cafaro detained pursuant to § 3142(e), on the ground that no condition of release
would assure the safety of the community or any person.
The District Court held a hearing at which the Government
made a detailed proffer of evidence. The Government's case
showed that Salerno was the "boss" of the Genovese Crime
Family of La Cosa Nostra and that Cafaro was a "captain" in
the Genovese Family. According to the Government's proffer, based in large part on conversations intercepted by a
court-ordered wiretap, the two respondents had participated
in wide-ranging conspiracies to aid their illegitimate enterprises through violent means. The Government also offered
the testimony of two of its trial witnesses, who would assert
that Salerno personally participated in two murder conspiracies. Salerno opposed the motion for detention, challenging
the credibility of the Government's witnesses. He offered
the testimony of several character witnesses as well as a letter from his doctor stating that he was suffering from a serious medical condition. Cafaro presented no evidence at the
hearing, but instead characterized the wiretap conversations
as merely "tough talk."
The District Court granted the Government's detention
motion, concluding that the Government had established by

86-87-0PINION
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clear and convincing evidence that no condition or combination of conditions of release would ensure the safety of the
community or any person:
"The activities of a criminal organization such as the
Genovese Family do not cease with the arrest of its principals and their release on even the most stringent of bail
conditions. The illegal businesses, in place for many
years, require constant attention and protection, or they
will fail. Under these circumstances, this court recognizes a strong incentive on the part of its leadership to
continue business as usual. When business as usual involves threats, beatings, and murder, the present danger such people pose in the community is self-evident."
631 F. Supp. 1364, 1375 (SDNY 1986).
Respondents appealed, contending that to·the extent that
the Bail Reform Act permits pretrial detention on the ground
that the arrestee is likely to commit future crimes, it is
unconstitutional on its face. Over a dissent, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed. 794
F. 2d 64 (1986). Although the court agreed that pretrial detention could be imposed if the defendants were likely to intimidate witnesses or otherwise jeopardize the trial process,
it found "§ 3142(e)'s authorization of pretrial detention [on the
ground of future dangerousness] repugnant to the concept of
substantive due process, which we believe prohibits the total
deprivation of liberty simply as a means of preventing future
crimes." Id., at 71-72. The court concluded that the Government could not, consistent with due process, detain persons who had not been accused of any crime merely because
they were thought to present a danger to the community.
Id., at 72, quoting United States v. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.
2d 984, 1000-1001 (CA2 1986) (opinion of Newman, J.). It
reasoned that our criminal law system holds persons accountable for past actions, not anticipated future actions. Although a court could detain an arrestee who threatened to
flee before trial, such detention would be permissible because
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it would serve the basic objective of a criminal systembringing the accused to trial. The court distinguished our
decision in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103 (1975), in which
we upheld police detention pursuant to arrest. The court
construed Gerstein as limiting such detention to the "'administrative steps incident to arrest."' 794 F. 2d, at 74, quoting
Gerstein, 420 U. S., at 114. The Court of Appeals also found
our decision in Schall v. Martin, 467 U. S. 253 (1984),
upholding postarrest pretrial detention of juveniles, inapposite because juveniles have a lesser interest in liberty than do
adults. The dissenting judge concluded that on its face, the
Bail Reform Act adequately balanced the Federal Government's compelling interests in public safety against the detainee's liberty interests.

II
A facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the most
difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger
must establish that no set of circumstances exists under
which the Act would be valid. The fact that the Bail Reform
Act might operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable
set of circumstances is insufficient to render it wholly invalid,
since we have not recognized an "overbreadth" doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment. Schall v.
Martin, supra, at 269, n. 18. We think respondents have
failed to shoulder their heavy burden to demonstrate that the
Act is "facially'' unconstitutional. 2
Respondents present two grounds for invalidating the Bail
Reform Act's provisions permitting pretrial detention on the-_- -___:__ ·_
basis of future dangerousness. First, they rely upon the
Court of Appeals' conclusion that the Act exceeds the limitations placed upon the Federal Government by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Second, they contend
We intimate no view on the validity of any aspects of the Act that are
not relevant to respondents' case. Nor have respondents claimed that the
Act is unconstitutional because of the way it was applied to the particular
facts of their case.
2
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that the Act contravenes the Eighth Amendment's proscription against excessive baiL We treat these contentions in
turn.
A
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides
that "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... " This Court has held
that the Due Process Clause protects individuals against two
types of government action. So-called "substantive due
process" prevents the government from engaging in conduct
that "shocks the conscience," Rochin v. California, 342 U. S.
165, 172 (1952), or interferes with rights "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319,
325-326 (1937). When government action depriving a person of life, liberty, or property survives substantive due
process scrutiny, it must still be implemented in a fair manner. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 335 (1976). This
requirement has traditionally been referred to as "procedural" due process.
Respondents first argue that the Act violates substantive
due process because the pretrial detention it authorizes constitutes impermissible punishment before trial. See Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 535, and n. 16 (1979). The Government, however, has never argued that pretrial detention
could be upheld if it were "punishment." The Court of.
Appeals assumed that pretrial detention under the Bail Reform Act is regulatory, not penal, and we agree that it is.
As an initial matter, the mere fact that a person is detained
does not inexorably lead to the conclusion that the government has imposed punishment. Bell v. Wolfish, supra, at
537. To determine whether a restriction on liberty constitutes impermissible punishment or permissible regulation,
we first look to legislative intent. Schall v. Martin, 467
U. S., at 269. Unless Congress expressly intended to impose punitive restrictions, the punitive/regulatory distinction
turns on "'whether an alternative purpose to which [the
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restriction] may rationally be connected is assignable for it,
and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned [to it]."' Ibid., quoting Kennedy v.
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U. S. 144, 168-169 (1963).
We conclude that the detention imposed by the Act falls on
the regulatory side of the dichotomy. The legislative history
of the Bail Reform Act clearly indicates that Congress did not
formulate the pretrial detention provisions as punishment for
dangerous individuals. See S. Rep. No. 98-225, p. 8. Congress instead perceived pretrial detention as a potential solution to a pressing societal problem. Id., at 4-7. There is no
doubt that preventing danger to the community is a legitimate regulatory goal. Schall v. Martin, supra.
Nor are the incidents of pretrial detention excessive in
relation to the regulatory goal Congress sought to achieve.
The Bail Reform Act carefully limits the circumstances under
which detention may be sought to the most serious of crimes.
See 18 U. S. C. § 3142(f) (detention hearings available if case
involves crimes of violence, offenses for which the sentence is
life imprisonment or death, serious drug offenses, or certain
repeat offenders). The arrestee is entitled to a prompt
detention hearing, ibid. and the maximum length of pretrial
detention is limited by the stringent time limitations of the
Speedy Trial Act. 3 See 18 U. S. C. §3161 et seq. (1982 ed.
and Supp. III). Moreover, as in Schall v. Martin, the conditions of confinement envisioned by the Act "appear to reflect
the regulatory purposes relied upon by the" government.
467 U. S., at 270. As in Schall, the statute at issue here requires that detainees be housed in a "facility separate, to the
extent practicable, from persons awaiting or serving sentences or being held in custody pending appeal." 18
U. S. C. §3142(i)(2). We conclude, therefore, that the pretrial detention contemplated by the Bail Reform Act is reguWe intimate no view as to the point at which detention in a particular
case might become excessively prolonged, and therefore punitive, in relation to Congress' regulatory goal.
3

,.
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latory in nature, and does not constitute punishment before
trial in violation of the Due Process Clause.
The Court of Appeals nevertheless concluded that "the
Due Process Clause prohibits pretrial detention on the
ground of danger to the community as a regulatory measure,
without regard to the duration of the detention." 794 F. 2d,
at 71. Respondents characterize the Due Process Clause as
erecting an impenetrable "wall" in this area that "no governmental interest-rational, important, compelling or otherwise-may surmount." Brief for Respondents 16.
We do not think the Clause lays down any such categorical
imperative. We have repeatedly held that the government's
regulatory interest in community safety can, in appropriate
circumstances, outweigh an individual's liberty interest.
For example, in times of war or insurrection, when society's
interest is at its peak, the government may detain individuals
whom the government believes to be dangerous. See
Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U. S. 160 (1948) (approving
unreviewable Executive power to detain enemy aliens in time
of war); Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U. S. 78, 84-85 (1909) (rejecting due process claim of individual jailed without probable
cause by Governor in time of insurrection). Even outside
the exigencies of war, we }).ave found that sufficiently compelling governmental interests can justify detention of dangerous persons. Thus, we have found no absolute constitutional
barrier to detention of potentially dangerous resident aliens
pending deportation proceedings. Carlson v. Landon, 342
U. S. 524, 537-542 (1952); Wong Wing v. United States, 163
U. S. 228 (1896). We have also held that the government
may detain mentally unstable individuals who present a danger to the public, Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S. 418 (1979),
and dangerous defendants who become incompetent to stand
trial, Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U. S. 715, 731-739 (1972);
Greenwood v. United States, 350 U. S. 366 (1956). We have
approved of postarrest regulatory detention of juveniles
when they present a continuing danger to the community.
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Schall v. Martin, supra. Even competent adults may face
substantial liberty restrictions as a result of the operation of
our criminal justice system. If the police suspect an individual of a crime, they may arrest and hold him until a neutral
magistrate determines whether probable cause exists.
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103 (1975). Finally, respondents concede and the Court of Appeals noted that an arrestee
may be incarcerated until trial if he presents a risk of flight,
see Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S., at 534, or a danger to
witnesses.
Respondents characterize all of these cases as exceptions
to the "general rule" of substantive due process that the
government may not detain a person prior to a judgment of
guilt in a criminal trial. Such a "general rule" may freely be
conceded, but we think that these cases show a sufficient
number of exceptions to the rule that the congressional action
challenged here can hardly be characterized as totally novel.
Given the well-established authority of the government, in
special circumstances, to restrain individuals' liberty prior to
or even without criminal trial and conviction, we think that
the present statute providing for pretrial detention on the
basis of dangerousness must be evaluated in precisely the
same manner that we evaluated the laws in the cases discussed above.
The government's interest in preventing crime by arrestees is both legitimate and compelling. De Veau v. Braisted,
363 U. S. 144, 155 (1960). In Schall, supra, we recognized
the strength of the State's interest in preventing juvenile
crime. This general concern with crime prevention is no less
compelling when the suspects are adults. Indeed, "[t]he
harm suffered by the victim of a crime is not dependent upon
the age of the perpetrator." Schall v. Martin, 467 U. S., at
264-265. The Bail Reform Act of 1984 responds to an even
more particularized governmental interest than the interest
we sustained in Schall. The statute we upheld in Schall permitted pretrial detention of any juvenile arrested on any
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charge after a showing that the individual might commit
some undefined further crimes. The Bail Reform Act, in
contrast, narrowly focuses on a particularly acute problem in
which the government interests are overwhelming. The Act
operates only on individuals who have been arrested for a
specific category of extremely serious offenses. 18 U. S. C.
§ 3142(f). Congress specifically found that these individuals
are far more likely to be responsible for dangerous acts in the
community after arrest. See S. Rep. No. 98-225, pp. 6-7.
Nor is the Act by any means a scattershot attempt to incapacitate those who are merely suspected of these serious
crimes. The government must first of all demonstrate probable cause to believe that the charged crime has been committed by the arrestee, but that is not enough. In a fullblown adversary hearing, the government must convince a
neutral decisionmaker by clear and convincing evidence that
no conditions of release can reasonably assure the safety of
the community or any person. 18 U. S. C. § 3142(f). While
the government's general interest in preventing crime is
compelling, even this interest is heightened when the government musters convincing proof that the arrestee, already indicted or held to answer for a serious crime, presents a demonstrable danger to the community. Under these narrow
circumstances, society's interest in crime prevention is at its
greatest.
On the other side of the scale, of course, is the individual's
strong interest in liberty. We do not minimize the importance and fundamental nature of this _right. But, as our
cases hold, this right may, in circumstances where the government's interest is sufficiently weighty, be subordinated to
the greater needs of society. We think that Congress' careful delineation of the circumstances under which detention
will be permitted satisfies this standard. When the government proves by clear and convincing evidence that an
arrestee presents an identified and articulable threat to an
individual or the community, we believe that, consistent with
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the Due Process Clause, a court may disable the arrestee
from executing that threat. Under these circumstances, we
cannot categorically state that pretrial detention "offends
some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental." Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97, 105 (1934).
Finally, we may dispose briefly of respondents' facial challenge to the procedures of the Bail Reform Act. To sustain
them against such a challenge, we need only find them "adequate to authorize the pretrial detention of at least some
[persons] charged with crimes," Schall, supra, at 264,
whether or not they might be insufficient in some particular
circumstances. We think they pass that test. As we stated
in Schall, "there is nothing inherently unattainable about a
prediction of future criminal conduct." Id., at 278; see Jurek
v. Texas, 428 U. S. 262, 274 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, PowELL, and STEVENS, JJ.); id., at 279 (WHITE, J., concurring in
judgment).
Under the Bail Reform Act, the procedures by which a judicial officer evaluates the likelihood of future dangerousness
are specifically designed to further the accuracy of that
determination. Detainees have a right to counsel at the detention hearing. 18 U. S. C. § 3142(f). They may testify in
their own behalf, present information by proffer or otherwise, and cross-examine witnesses who appear at the hearing. Ibid. The judicial officer charged with the responsibility of determining the appropriateness of detention is guided
by statutorily enumerated factors, which include the nature
and the circumstances of the charges, the weight of the evidence, the history and characteristics of the putative offender, and the danger to the community. § 3142(g). The
government must prove its case by clear and convincing evidence. § 3142(0. Finally, the judicial officer must include
written findings of fact and a written statement of reasons for
a decision to detain. § 3142(i). The Act's review provisions,

•,
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§ 3145(c), provide for immediate appellate review of the detention decision.
We think these extensive safeguards suffice to repel a facial challenge. The protections are more exacting than those
we found sufficient in the juvenile context, see Schall, 467
U. S., at 275-281, and they far exceed what we found necessary to effect limited postarrest detention in Gerstein v.
Pugh, 420 U. S. 103 (1975). Given the legitimate and compelling regulatory purpose of the Act and the procedural protections it offers, we conclude that the Act is not facially
invalid under the Due Process Clause of the ·Fifth
Amendment.
B

Respondents also contend that the Bail Reform Act violates the Excessive Bail Clause of the Eighth Amendment.
The Court of Appeals did not addres2 this issue because it
found that the Act violates the Due Process Clause. We
think that the Act survives a challenge founded upon the
Eighth Amendment.
The Eighth Amendment addresses pretrial release by providing merely that "Excessive bail shall not be required."
This Clause, of course, says nothing about whether bail shall
be available at all. Respondents nevertheless contend that
this Clause grants them a right to bail calculated solely upon
considerations of flight. They rely on Stack v: Boyle, 342
U. S. 1, 5 (1951), in which the Court stated that "Bail set at a
figure higher than an amount reasonably calculated [to
ensure the defendant's presence at trial] is 'excessive' under
the Eighth Amendment." In respondents' view, since the
Bail Reform Act allows a court essentially to set bail at an
infinite amount for reasons not related to the risk of flight, it
violates the Excessive Bail Clause. Respondents concede
that the right to bail they have discovered in the Eighth
Amendment is not absolute. A court may, for example,
refuse bail in capital cases. And, as the Court of Appeals
noted and respondents admit, a court may refuse bail when

86-87-0PINION
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the defendant presents a threat to the judicial process by
intimidating witnesses. Brief for Respondents 21-22. Respondents characterize these exceptions as consistent with
what they claim to be the sole purpose of bail-to ensure integrity of the judicial process.
While we agree that a primary function of bail is to safeguard the courts' role in adjudicating the guilt or innocence of
defendants, we reject the proposition that the Eighth
Amendment categorically prohibits the government from
pursuing other admittedly compelling interests through
regulation of pretrial release. The above-quoted dicta in
Stack v. Boyle is far too slender a reed on which to rest this
argument. The Court in Stack had no occasion to consider
whether the Excessive Bail Clause requires courts to admit
all defendants to bail, because the statute before the Court in
that case in fact allowed the defendants to be bailed. Thus,
the Court had to determine only whether bail, admittedly
available in that case, was excessive if set at a sum greater
than that necessary to ensure the arrestees' presence at trial.
The holding of Stack is illuminated by the Court's holding
just four months later in Carlson v. Landon, 342 U. S. 524
(1952). In that case, remarkably similar to the present
action, the detainees had been arrested and held without bail
pending a determination of deportability. The Attorney
General refused to release the individuals, "on the ground
that there was reasonable cause to believe that [their] release
would be prejudicial to the public interest and would endanger the welfare and safety of the United States." Id., at 529
(emphasis added). The detainees brought the same challenge that respondents bring to us today: the Eighth Amendment required them to be admitted to bail. The Court
squarely rejected this proposition:
"The bail clause was lifted with slight changes from
the English Bill of Rights Act. In England that clause
has never been thought to accord a right to bail in all
cases, but merely to provide that bail shall not be exces-
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sive in those cases where it is proper to grant bail.
When this clause was carried over into our Bill of Rights,
nothing was said that indicated any different concept.
The Eighth Amendment has not prevented Congress
from defining the classes of cases in which bail shall be
allowed in this country. Thus, in criminal cases bail is
not compulsory where the punishment may be death.
Indeed, the very language of the Amendment fails to say
all arrests must be bailable." Id., at 545-546 (footnotes
omitted).
Carlson v. Landon was a civil case, and we need not decide
today whether the Excessive Bail Clause speaks at all to
Congress' power to define the classes of criminal arrestees
who shall be admitted to bail. For even if we were to conclude that the Eighth Amendment imposes some substantive
limitations on the National Legislature's powers in this area,
we would still hold that the Bail Reform Act is valid. Nothing in the text of the Bail Clause limits permissible government considerations solely to questions of flight. The only
arguable substantive limitation of the Bail Clause is that the
government's proposed conditions of release or detention not
be "excessive" in light of the perceived evil. Of course, to
determine whether the government's response is excessive,
we must compare that response against the interest the government seeks to protect by means of that response. Thus,
when the government has admitted that its only interest is in
preventing flight, bail must be set by a court at a -sum designed to ensure that goal, and no more; Stack v. Boyle, supra. We believe that when Congress has mandated detention on the basis of a compelling interest other than prevention of flight, as it has here, the Eighth Amendment does
not require release on bail.

III
In our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to
trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception. We

',
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hold that the provisions for pretrial detention in the Bail
Reform Act of 1984 fall within that carefully limited exception. The Act authorizes the detention prior to trial of
arrestees charged with serious felonies who are found after
an adversary hearing to pose a threat to the safety of individuals or to the community which no condition of release can
dispel. The numerous procedural safeguards detailed above
must attend this adversary hearing. We are unwilling to
say that this congressional determination, based as it is upon
that primary concern of every government-a concern for the
safety and indeed the lives of its citizens-on its face violates
either the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment or the
Excessive Bail Clause of the Eighth Amendment.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore
Reversed.
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JUSTICE 9YRON R . WHITE

86-87 - United States v. Salerno and Cafaro

Dear Chief,
Your suggested changes are acceptable to
me.

Sincerely yours,

The Chief Justice
Copies to:

Justice Blackmun
Justice Powell
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March 9, 1987

JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

Re:

✓

No. 86-87, United States v. Salerno

Dear Chief:
This is in response to your letter of this morning.
If
Sandra and Nino will join your proposed opinion, if the
changes on pages 11 and 12 of the forthcoming third draft are
adopted, I shall go along.
I do so despite my hesitancy
about prediction of future dangerousness (which you now mention on the revised page 11). See my dissent in Barefoot v.
Estelle, 463 U.S., at 920.
Sincerely,
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The Chief Justice
cc:

Justice
Justice
Justice
Justice

White
Powell
O'Connor
.Scalia
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THE CHIEF JUST I CE

March 9, 1987

Re:

No. 86-87

United States v. Salerno

Dear Byron, Harry and Lewis,
Nino and Sandra have said they would join my proposed
opinion for the Court in this case if I make the changes
indicated in the last three paragraphs of part IIA. The
enclosed revision makes those changes, and the result is to
narrow somewhat the holding of that part of the opinion.
While I think I preferred the original draft, I am happy to
make these changes in order to get Sandra and Nino to join
the opinion. I wanted to circulate them to you to see if
they are acceptable to you before circulating to the
v1
Conference as a whole.
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Sincerely,

Justice White
Justice Blackmun
Justice Powell
cc:

Justice O'Connor
Justice Scalia
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Ma ch 10, 1987

86~87 United States v. Salerno

Dear Chief:
This refers to your letter of March 9, and the
changes tn the last three paraqraphs of Part II-1t of your

op:i.nion.
Although I was happy with your opinion as originaly cJrculated, the proposed changes are entirely acceptable

to me.
Slncerely,

The Chief Just lee
lfp/sn

cc:

Justice White
Just ice Black mun
Justice O'Connor
Just ice Seal ia

Jitprtmt Qintt of tlft ~ittb Jtatt•

Jlulfiqton. JI. GI.
CHAMBERS

21t,,.,

or

JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA

March 10, 1987

Re:

No. 86-87 - United States v. Salerno

Dear Chief:
I would be pleased to join your opinion.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference
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JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

March 26, 1987
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE

United States v. Salerno, No. 86-87.
In connection with my research for the dissent in this case,
I have been informed that in affidavits filed in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York,
dated March 18, 1987, the Government discloses that appellee
Vincent Cafaro became a cooperating witness in September 1986.
Furthermore, according to the affidavit of Warren Neil Eggleston,
then the Deputy Chief Appellate Attorney in the Southern
District, on October 8, 1986, "the Government consented to Mr.
Cafaro's temporary release on bail." See Affidavit of Eggleston,
110 (attached, emphasis added). This statement is difficult to
reconcile with the statement in the Government's Reply Brief in
this Court, filed January 12, 1987, that "Cafaro was temporarily
released for medical treatment" but was "still subject to the
pretrial detention order." Reply Brief, at 1-2, n.1.
These recent disclosures by the Government in the Southern
District suggest to me that there may not have been a live
controversy in this case at the time of argument. If other
Members of the Conference agree, I would be in favor of
requesting the Clerk in the Southern District of New York to
supplement the record here with the subsequent filings in the
District Court. I also believe that a request for supplemental
briefing on the jurisdictional issues would now be appropriate.
Sincerely,
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

-----------------------------------x
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
AFFIDAVIT

- v. -

..

ANTHONY SALERNO, et al.,

SS 86 Cr. 245 (MJL)

Defendants.

-----------------------------------x
STATE OF NEW YORK
)
COUNTY OF NEW YORK
: ss.:
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK)
WARREN NEIL EGGLESTON, being duly sworn, deposes and

says:
1.

I am now the Deputy Chief Counsel of the House of

Representatives Select Committee To Investigate Covert Arms
Transactions With Iran.

Until mid-January, 1987, I was an

Assistant United States Attorney in the Office of Rudolph W.
Giuliani, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New
York.

From February 1986 _, until November 30, 1986, I was Chief

Appellate Attorney, and from March, 1985 until February, 1986, I
was Deputy Chief Appellate Attorney in Mr. Giuliani's Office.
2.

In mid-September, 1986, this office received

confidential information that Vincent Cafaro, who then was
incarcerated in the Metropolitan Correctional Center, wanted to
talk to a representative of the Government.

Because Mr. Cafaro

was under indictment in the above-captioned case, I arranged for

him to meet with an investigator from this Office who was not
involved with the prosecution of this case to determine what Mr.
Cafaro wanted to discuss.
3.

At that meeting, in mid-September, 1986, Mr.

Cafaro told our investigator that he indeed had sent word that he

wanted to meet with a representative of the United States
Attorney's Office and that the subject he wanted to discuss was
his potential cooperation with the Government.
met with Mr. Cafaro.

A day later, I

He reiterated that he wanted to meet with a

representative of this Office, but that he did not want his
then-counsel to know about the meeting.

We proceeded to discuss

his possible cooperation and agreed to meet again.
4.

Because of Mr. Cafaro's status as an indicted

defendant, I regarded it as advisable to erect a "Chinese Wall"
within this Office, within the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
and, in large part, between this Office and the FBI in order to
protect the right to counsel of Mr. Cafaro as well as of his
co-defendants.

I coordinated the execution of the steps

necessary to protect those rights.
S.

Assistant United States Attorneys Alan M. Cohen

and Mark R. Hellerer, who were prosecuting Mr. Cafaro, were
informed that Mr. Cafaro had contacted us about the possibility
of cooperation, but they were not told anything about the
substance of our discussions with him.

-
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6.

During the early stages of our discussions with

Mr. Cafaro, I informed Special Agent James M. Kessler of the FBI
of the possibility that Mr. Cafaro would become a cooperating
witness.

As Coordinating Supervisory Special Agent of the

Organized Crime Branch of the FBI's New York Office, Agent
Kessler was, in my view, best suited to be the FBI's representative to advise this Office as our discussions with Mr. Cafaro
proceeded.
7.

I advised Agent Kessler about the importance of

preventing the transmission to the Assistant United State~
Attorneys or agents working on the prosecution of the abovecaptioned case of any information that we might obtain from Mr.
Cafaro, especially information obtained from defendants under
indictment in the case.

Accordingly, I instructed Agent Kessler

to construct a Chinese Wall between the agents who were working
on the Salerno prosecution and any agents whom he assigned to
work with Mr. Cafaro.

I advised Agent Kessler to tell all of the

agents who would be working with Mr. Cafaro about the purpose and
importance of the Chinese Wall and that as an additional precau-

.

tion they were to say nothing to the agents working on the
Salerno prosecution about even the fact of Mr. Cafaro's
cooperation.
8.

Agent Kessler advised me that Supervisory Special

Agent Damon Taylor would be assigned to coordinate the debriefing
and covert phase of Mr. Cafaro's cooperation.

Agent Taylor assigned

Special Agent Richard Dill to assist him iri the operation.

I

gave Agent Dill the same precautionary instructions I had given

-
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Agent Kossler and directed Agent Dill to relay those instructions
carefully to Agent Taylor.

I further directed Agent Dill to

instruct Mr. Cafaro not to relay to the FBI or this Office any
information whatever concerning the defense strategy in the
Salerno case.

Thereafter, on several occasions, I personally

met with Agent Taylor and gave him the same instructions.
9.

In late September, 1986, Mr. Cafaro was taken to a

hospital for a medical examination with the Government's consent.
Shortly thereafter, Mr. Cafaro secretly retained new counsel for
the purpose of continuing his discussions with the Government
and, after consultation with that new counsel, agreed to
cooperate with the Government's investigation of Organized Crime
in New York.

As part of his understanding with the Government,

Mr. Cafaro agreed to assist our investigation by working in a
covert capacity and to testify as required.
10.

On October 7, 1986, the Government and Mr.

Cafaro's new counsel together informed Judge Lowe of the possibility that Mr. Cafaro would become a cooperating witness and
that he had retained new counsel in connection therewith.
(

The

following day, the Government consented to Mr. Cafaro's ~ emporary

\ release on bail.
11.

In approximately mid-October, .Mr. Cafaro began to

assist the FBI in its ongoing investigation of Organized Crime in
New York.

That assistance included meetings which Mr. Cafaro

attended and recorded concerning possible criminal conduct other
than that charged in the Salerno Indictment.
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12.

On numerous occasions thereafter, I met with or

talked to agents of the FBI who were involved in the investigation and warned them about the continuing need to respect the
Chinese Wall.
13.

Assistant United States Attorneys Alan M. Cohen,

and Mark R. Hellerer were informed that Mr. Cafaro had agreed to
cooperate and to participate in convert phases of the Government's continuing investigation.

At no time, however, did I

reveal to Messrs. Cohen or Hellerer the substance of the
information that Mr. Cafaro was providing or the nature of the
covert work in which he was engaged.
14.

At the request of Assistant United States

Attorneys Cohen and Hellerer, Mr. Cafaro was asked a series of
specific questions about the charges contained and defendants
named in the Indictment in this case.

The purpose of asking

those questions was to determine whether any of the defendants
charged had not committed any the cr~es charged or whether any of
the crimes charged had not occurred.

Mr. Cafaro's answers fully

satisfied me that the Indictment was an accurate and fair
charging instrument.

Agent Taylor so informed Messrs. Cohen and

Hellerer.
15.

On October 20, 1986, the FBI informed me that Mr.

Cafaro had been summoned by his Organized Crime superiors to a
meeting concerning a criminal matter other than any of the crimes
charged in the Indictment.

One or more of Mr. Cafaro's indicted

co-defendants were expected to attend the meeting.

In addition,

the meeting was scheduled to be held in the office of the lawyer
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for one of the Salerno defendants, because the defendants had
concluded that there was no other place where they could meet
without violating their bail restrictions and thus risking
revocation of bail and remand.

After reviewing the pertinent

caselaw, I advised the FBI that Mr. Cafaro could lawfully attend
the meeting and record the conversation that occurred for the
following reasons:

a) the stated purpose of the meeting was for

something other than to discuss defense strategy; b) non-defendants were expected to be present as well as defendants; c)
criminal activities other than those charged in the Salerno
Indictment were expected to be discussed; d) Mr. Cafaro was
ordered to attend the meeting; and e) perhaps most significant,
the Government would not seek to offer at the trial of the
Salerno Indictment any evidence derived from the meeting if
prohibited by Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964);
Maine v. Moulton, 106 s.ct. 477 (1985); or United States v.
Ginsberg, 758 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1985).
16.

The meeting took place on October 28, 1986, at

the law office of Robert Ellis; Esq., and the resulting conversation was recorded.

The only indicted def:endants present

were Vincent DiNapoli and Louis DiNapoli.
reviewed the recording that had been made.

After the meeting, I
For all but the last

few minutes of the conversation, the participants discussed historical and ongoing crimes.

No defense lawyers were present, and

the conversation did not relate to defense strategy for the Salerno
trial.

At the very end of the meeting, the participants discussed

vaguely whether any defendants might plead guilty in Salerno.

-
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Mr. Ellis, counsel for Louis DiNapoli, then joined the meeting.
In the presence of others, including unindicted individuals, Mr.
DiNapoli posed some very general questions to Mr. Ellis about how
the Government might be expected to proceed at trial if one indicte
defendant (not one of the defendants at the meeting) chose to pleao
guilty.

Mr. Ellis speculated very generally in response that such

plea would not materially alter the Government's proof at the trial
of the remaining defendants.

After listening to the conversation,

I instructed the FBI agents to duplicate the tape up to the point
at which Mr. Ellis joined the conversation and transcribe the
conversation up to the same point.

I further directed the agents

to store the complete tape securely and not to disclose it to anyone outside the immediate operational group.

None of the prosecu-

tors or agents who are preparing the Salerno case for trial has ever
heard or been told about the contents of that recorded conversation,
and the Government will not offer it in evidence at the trial of
~ draft transcript of the conversation is

this Indictment.

submitted herewith for the Court's in camera review.
17.

In mid-November, 1986, Assistant United States

Attorney Anne T. Vitale of this Office was informed that Mr.
Cafaro was cooperating : with the Government and was engaged in a
covert aspect of the investigation.

Assistant United States

Attorney Vitale was assigned to assist with that aspect of the
investigation.

Thereafter, in December, 1986, Assistant United

States Attorney Howard E. Heiss of this Office also was assigned
to assist in the covert phase of the investigation.

Both were

carefully instructed about the purpose and nature of the Chinese
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Walls that had been erected and told not to reveal to Assistant
United States Attorneys Cohen or Hellerer or to any of the agents
working with Messrs. Cohen and Hellerer any information that came
into their possession during their participation in the investigation in which Mr. Cafaro was cooperating.
18.

As the operation proceeded, the participating

agents kept me informed about meetings which had been held and
about the substance of what had occurred.

They also gave me a

copy of the recordings made at the meetings, which I reviewed.

I

at no time revealed such information to Assistant United States
Attorneys Cohen or Hellerer or to the agents helping to prepare
the Salerno case for trial.

I instructed the agents working on

the ongoing investigation to do the same.

At no time during my

participation in this matter did I learn any information whatever
about the strategy that the defendants may use in defending
against the charges in this Indictment.

WARREN NEIL EGGLESTON

Sworn to before me this
18th day of March, 1987.
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JUSTICE SANDRA DAY o'CONNOR

March 10, 1987

No. 86-87

United States v. Salerno

Dear Chief,
Please join me in your opinion.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice

Copies to the Conference
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JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

March 27, 1987

Re:

✓

86-87 - United States v. Salerno

Dear Chief:
It seems to me that your memorandum of this date
does not take into account the fact that we now know
that the attorney who argued this case on the
assumption that he could properly represent both
Salerno and Cafaro may well have been unaware of a
serious conflict between the interest of his two
clients. There may be many reasons why he could not
bring the facts in the Eggleston affidavit to our
attention. It is also possible that the Solicitor
General has not been advised of the relevant facts in
view of the "Chinese Wall" that is repeatedly
referred to in the affidavit. Although I am not
disposed to set the case down for further briefing or
argument at this point, it does seem to me that it
may well be appropriate to invite the Solicitor
General to comment on what appears to be a real
possibility that the case is in fact moot.
Respectfully,

//L
The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference
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Memorandum to the Conference
Re:

No. 86-87, United States v. Salerno

I do not believe that there is a substantial question
of mootness or collusion presented in this case. To my
mind, it is not difficult at all to reconcile the affidavit
circulated yesterday with the government's representations
in this Court. The Solicitor General maintained that Cafaro
was temporarily released. Reply Brief, at 1-2, n. 1. The
affidavit of the former Assistant United States Attorney
only confirms this: "the Government consented to Mr.
Cafaro's temporary release on bail." Affidavit of
Eggleston, 110 (emphasis added). We have no reason to
disbelieve the Solicitor General's representation that
Cafaro was and still is "subject to the pretrial detention
order." Reply Brief, at 1-2, n. 1.
I do not think that this speculation about Cafaro's
cooperation with the government warrants our delving into
the fine points of an ongoing criminal investigation in the
Southern District of New York. Both the Solicitor General
and Respondents' attorney have an obligation to inform this
Court about developments that affect our jurisdiction to
decide the case. Neither of these parties has made any
representation whatsoever on this point. We are, after all,
an appellate court, and not an investigative bureau. The
Salerno case was properly presented to us, and I think we
ought to decide its merits.
Sincerely,

Wv✓

March 30, 1987

86-87 United States v. Salerno

Dear Chief:

I agree with your memo as to the status of th i.s

case.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
lfp/ss

cc:

'l'he Conference
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JUSTICE WM . J . BRENNAN, JR .

May 4, 1987

No. 86-87

United States v. Salerno

Dear Thurgood,
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Justice Marshall
Copies to the Conference
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86-87 United States v. Salerno
CJ for the Court 1/27/87
1st draft 2/18/87
2nd draft 3/5/87
3rd draft 3/10/87
4th draft 5/4/87
Joined by BRW 2/18/87
LFP 2/19/87
HAB 3/2/87
soc , 3/10/87
AS 3/10/87
TM dissenting
1st draft 4/30/87
2nd draft 5/6/87
Joined by WJB 5/4/87
JPS dissenting
1st draft 5/20/87
TM will dissent 2/18/87
SOC plans to concur in the judgment and perhaps Parts I
and IIB.
JPS awaiting TM's dissent 2/20/87

